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The United States patent system was born during the Industrial
Age—at a time where the focus was on promoting innovation in
machines and tangible means of changing the world. With the dawn of
the Information Age, innovation is increasingly intangible. The
Industrial Age laws, as currently interpreted, are not well-suited for
the changing and evolving technological world. Information Age
innovators face challenges at the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, through the judicial system and at the United States
International Trade Commission. It is time for a change in the system
to reflect the realities of modern technology. Adequate protection is not
currently provided for intangible innovations. This lack of protection
has wide-ranging implications, especially now as data processing is
increasingly migrating to “the cloud,” geographic boundaries are
eroding, and intangible technology is advancing in importance. The
Industrial Age laws can incentivize innovation in the Information
Age—and it is time to recognize this before private ordering subsumes
the public interest.
INTRODUCTION
Technology is outpacing our patent system. Intangible
innovations are eroding geographic boundaries and defying
categorization. Absent change, those leading the evolution will leave
the patent system behind, seeking protection through private
ordering, the use of trade secrets, or other forms of protection that do
not uphold the public’s interest in building a storehouse of knowledge.
The Industrial Age laws, as currently interpreted, are not well-suited
for the changing and evolving technological world. This Article is the
first of its kind to analyze the difficulty in patenting the intangible
and the issues innovators face at the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (Patent Office or PTO) through the judicial system
and at the United States International Trade Commission. It is time
for a change in the system to reflect the realities of modern technology.
Adequate protection is not currently provided for intangible
innovations. This lack of protection has wide-ranging implications,
especially now as data processing is increasingly migrating to “the
cloud,” geographic boundaries are eroding, and intangible technology
is advancing in importance.
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The United States patent system was born during the Industrial
Age—at a time where the focus was on promoting innovation in
machines and tangible means of changing the world. The patent
system reflects the incentives to innovate in the field of tangible
advances. Much of modern innovation focuses on data—an intangible
asset fraught with value and judgment. Consider the example of
orthodontia. Traditionally, teeth were straightened by an orthodontist
placing metal braces on a patient’s teeth—a tangible advance in
technology. Today, that method is still common, however, a system of
using clear, plastic retainers to realign and correct patients’ teeth
known as the InvisalignTM system is changing the face of orthodontia.
Align Technology (Align), an orthodontic innovator, owns a number of
patents related to the InvisalignTM system.1 ClearCorrect Operating
(ClearCorrect) is a competitor, also making clear retainers that
straighten patient’s teeth without using traditional metal braces.2
Align’s technology requires taking an impression of the patient’s
teeth, creating a computer model of the impression, and using a 3-D
printer to print a series of retainers that are then worn by the patient
to straighten their teeth.3 The innovation is in the translation of the
impression of the teeth to pure data that can be uploaded to the cloud.
That same innovation has made circumvention of traditional
intellectual property a relatively straightforward enterprise for
Align’s competitors. ClearCorrect, for instance, takes an impression of
the patient’s teeth, uploads the impression to the internet, uses
ClearCorrect Pakistan—a Pakistani company—to create a computer
model of the impression in Pakistan, downloads the computer model,
and prints the retainers in the United States.4 The patient is unaware

1. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,070,487 (issued Dec. 6, 2011).
2. See, e.g., ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283,
1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
3. Id.
4. In the ongoing Invisalign litigation, the accused products are digital models,
digital data, and treatment plans. The treatment plans are virtual 3-D models of the
desired position of patients’ teeth at various stages of orthodontic treatment. The
models are initially created based on impressions of patients’ teeth, and that occurs in
the United States. The impressions are uploaded to a server and downloaded in
Pakistan, where the models are manipulated to create a treatment plan. The digital
models, digital data, and treatment plans are electronically transmitted by uploading
them to a server for use in the United States. The digital models are then used in the
United States to print 3-D physical models of a patient’s teeth. The aligners are then
formed over the physical models of the patient’s teeth. Id.
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of where each step in the patented method took place.5 The intangible
nature of the data used in performing this method of straightening the
teeth permits a seamless use of the method across geographic and
across patent boundaries. Align has faced difficulties in protecting its
valuable intellectual property rights,6 finding itself defending itself
before the Patent Office,7 in the judicial system,8 and before the
United States International Trade Commission.9 This multi-phased
litigation strategy is a common, expensive, and time-consuming
strategy. The heart of Align’s innovative method of straightening
teeth is the data, and it is protecting the intangible data that poses
Align significant problems.
All intellectual property is intangible, yet there is a material
difference in the value the patent system holds for patents on tangible
innovations and patents covering the intangible. Part II of this Article
asks what it means to be intangible and analyzes the history behind
patenting data, methods, and other intangible assets. Next, the
Article addresses the fundamental issues with using legislation
drafted before the Information Age to protect modern technology and
proposes clarifying the definition of invention to reflect the purpose
behind the patent system in Part III. The question of when intangible
intellectual property is used within the United States, and therefore
is subject to protection under the United States Patent Code, is
discussed in Part IV. Domestic industry is directly impacted by
electronic transmissions and other intangible, patentable assets, and
Part V analyzes when the United States International Trade
Commission has jurisdiction over intangible articles. Many of the
issues addressed throughout this Article, but not all, can be dealt with
during patent prosecution, and Part VI discusses claim drafting in the
5. The important thing to note here is that some steps occur in the United States
and some steps occur in Pakistan, and that the tangible 3-D printed clear retainers
themselves do not violate the method claim of the patent. Id. at 1287–88.
6. For example, in 2018, Align Technology had over $2 billion in revenue. Press
Release, Align Tech. Inc., Align Technology Announces Record 2018 Financial Results
(Jan. 29, 2019), http://investor.aligntech.com/news-releases/news-release-details/
align-technology-announces-record-2018-financial-results.
7. Alana Seiders, U.S. Patent Office Sides with ClearCorrect to Reexamine
Invisalign Patent Portfolio, CLEARLYCORRECT CLEARLY BLOG (June 17, 2015),
http://blog.clearcorrect.com/post/US-Patent-Office-Sides-with-ClearCorrect-toReexamine-Invisalign-Patent-Portfolio.aspx.
8. See, e.g., Align Tech., Inc. v. ClearCorrect, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00695, 2017 WL
3726048, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2017).
9. In re Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for Use in
Making Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances, Inv. No. 337-TA-833,
USITC Pub. 4555 (Apr. 10, 2014) [hereinafter 833 Investigation].
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Information Age. Finally, Part VII talks about protecting the
intangible through private ordering, given the tremendous difficulties
in otherwise protecting the intangible.
The Information Age is here, and the problems facing Information
Age innovators are multi-faceted, expensive, and obstruct the public
interest in building a storehouse of knowledge. It is time to take a
closer look at how the Industrial Age laws protect the intangible
through clarifying the legislative definitions, coming to a new
understanding of patent boundaries, and arming the United States
International Trade Commission with the tools it needs to protect
domestic industry.
I. INTANGIBILITY
A. The Intangible Nature of Patents Themselves
A patent grants the patentee the right to exclude others from
making, selling, using, offering to sell, or importing the patented
innovation.10 The patent gives the patentee no right to make or use
the invention, and there is nothing in the patent grant that a patentee
can hold on to—the protection is found in the written description and
claims. Patents are intangible. Despite “attributes of personal
property,”11 a patent is not something that can be touched. In 1926,
the Eighth Circuit wrote: “Good will is property of an intangible
nature. It differs from such intangibles as patents, copyrights,
licenses, and franchises, because, while in a certain sense it inheres
in and is used in the business, it is not subject to depreciation . . . .”12
The Uniform Commercial Code defines “general intangible” and
expressly states that “intellectual property” is an example of a
“general intangible” in the Official Comment.13 It is no wonder, then,
that when an intangible patent claims intangible subject matter, the
scope of the rights granted is unclear.14

10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
12. Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 1926).
13. See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1972).
14. To take it a step further, in 2006, a patent application was filed claiming a
method of purchasing and leasing back intangible property, such as intellectual
property, titled Intangible Property Transaction and Leaseback Business Method. This
is an example of an intangible asset (the patent application) claiming an intangible
innovation (a method) in the field of intangible assets (particularly intellectual
property). U.S. Patent No. 260, 549 (filed Nov. 8, 2007).
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B. Useful, Concrete, and Tangible
Setting forth patent-eligible subject matter, Section 101 of the
Patent Act maintains textual neutrality, failing to differentiate
between machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, and
patents claiming methods.15 Despite the neutrality of this text, and,
despite the Federal Circuit writing that “[w]hether stated implicitly
or explicitly, we consider the scope of § 101 to be the same regardless
of the form—machine or process—in which a particular claim is
drafted[,]”16 distinctions continue to be drawn between the tangible
and the intangible.
The history of such distinctions has deep roots in the United
States patent system. Over thirty years ago, on January 29, 1988,
Kuriappan P. Alappatt, Edward E. Averill, and James G. Larsen
(collectively Alappat) applied for a patent claiming “a means for
creating a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope.”17 The
Patent Office rejected the patent application as drawn to nonstatutory subject matter, i.e., a mathematical formula.18 Alappat
appealed to the Federal Circuit where Judge Rich wrote that “certain
types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent
nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of
practical application, and thus that subject matter is not, in and of
itself, entitled to patent protection.”19 Judge Rich went on to find that
Alappat’s invention, however, was not a “disembodied mathematical
concept which may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a
specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”20
The Federal Circuit embraced this new subject-matter specific test for
patentability in 1998, holding that business method claims were
patent-eligible subject matter if the claims produce “a useful, concrete
15. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Professor Holbrook addressed this issue in his 2016 article,
pointing out that, with one rarely used exception, sections 101, 102, and 103 of the
Patent Act of 1952 and the America Invents Act, which are the bulwark of all domestic
patent protections, are textually neutral with respect to the type of invention. Under
the Patent Act of 1952, there was a statutory provision differentiating between
processes in the biotechnological arts and other methods. The America Invents Act
eliminated this provision. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism,
102 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1007–08 (2017).
16. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
1999), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
17. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re Bilski,
545 F.3d 943.
18. Id. at 1539.
19. Id. at 1543.
20. Id. at 1544.
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and tangible result.”21 In 1999, the Federal Circuit re-emphasized this
rule, finding that a “non-abstract” process claimed patent-eligible
subject matter because it “applie[d] the Boolean principle to produce
a useful, concrete, tangible result.”22
Subsequently, the Patent Office issued Interim Guidelines for
Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility.23 The Interim Guidelines informed the examiners that
subject matter could be found patent eligible “if the claimed invention
physically transforms an article or physical object to a different state
or thing, or if the claimed invention otherwise produces a useful,
concrete, and tangible result.” 24 Nowhere in the Interim Guidelines
is the word intangible found.25 The Interim Guidelines expressly and
incorrectly stated that: “the opposite meaning of ‘tangible’ is
‘abstract.’” 26
It was not until 2010 that the Supreme Court drew a distinction
between intangible and abstract.27 Writing that Industrial Age
processes (“inventions grounded in a physical or other tangible form”)
are of a different patentable nature than Information Age processes
(“software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions
based on linear programming, data compression, and the
manipulation of digital signals”), the Supreme Court acknowledged
the difficulty in applying the same Industrial Age patent laws to
both.28 Industrial Age processes typically have tangible components
and, by association, are tangible.29 Information Age processes lack
tangible components, and, therefore, in their intangibility, are more
likely to claim nothing more than abstract ideas and, therefore, less
likely to be drawn to patentable subject matter. 30 Importing a
tangibility requirement into the patent-eligibility question, the
Supreme Court essentially held that if the intangible has a tangible
component, it should be treated as tangible—not intangible—even

21. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544).
22. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
23. Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Interim
Guidelines], https://www.uspto.gov/news/og/2005/week47/patgupa.htm.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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though it is an intangible process.31 A process may be patent eligible
if “’(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.’”32
However, recognizing the distinction between Information Age
technologies and Industrial Age technologies, the Supreme Court
went on to say that:
The machine-or-transformation test may well provide
a sufficient basis for evaluating processes similar to
those in the Industrial Age-for example, inventions
grounded in a physical or other tangible form. But
there are reasons to doubt whether the test should be
the sole criterion for determining the patentability of
inventions in the Information Age. 33
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the machine-ortransformation test was a useful way of determining patent
eligibility—but that an innovation that failed the machine-ortransformation test could still be patent eligible.34
Patenting the intangible continued to be an issue in litigation, and
in 2014, writing on the patentability of software, without using the
word “software” once, Justice Thomas wrote that the method claims
at issue “which merely require generic computer implementation, fail
to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”35 The
patentee argued that the claims were tangible—as they recited the
use of a computer—which “necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather
than purely conceptual, realm.”36 The Supreme Court found that the
fact that the claims recite a tangible element, a generic computer, was
not enough to render the claims patent eligible. 37 Justice Thomas, in
extrapolating what might otherwise be patentable, highlighted the
lack of tangibility, stating that “[t]he method claims do not, for
example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. . . .
Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or
technical field.”38 The Supreme Court then set forth a two-part test
which first asks if the claim is “directed to [a] patent-ineligible
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 602 (quoting In re Bilski 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 604–06.
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 225.
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concept” such as an abstract idea, and then asks if there is some other
aspect to the claim that “‘transform[s] the . . . claim’ into a patent
eligible application,” and merely reciting a tangible element is not
enough to transform the claim.39 The decision in Alice emphasizes the
difficulty of patenting Information Age inventions using an Industrial
Age patent system.40
Just a few months later, the Federal Circuit evaluated the patenteligibility of a method directed to collecting fees from consumers who
viewed Internet advertisements.41 Judge Lourie wrote that the
claimed method “recites an abstraction—an idea, having no particular
concrete or tangible form.”42 Although the majority opinion held that
“the addition of merely novel or non-routine components to the
claimed idea [does not] necessarily turn[] an abstraction into
something concrete,” Judge Mayer, in concurrence, asserted that an
abstract idea “can escape the realm of the abstract only through
concrete application.”43 Taking it a step further, Judge Mayer wrote
that “[t]his concrete application is new technology—taking a scientific
principle or natural law and ‘tying it down’ by implementing it in a
precisely defined manner.” 44 The Federal Circuit held that the
abstract idea at issue was not patent eligible, despite reciting a
general-purpose computer, as no claim was made to a particular
machine nor was a tangible transformation performed.45
The intangible remains difficult to patent absent a concrete or
tangible element. One judge wrote that “[n]either the U.S. Supreme
Court nor the Federal Circuit has set forth a bright-line test
separating abstract ideas from concepts that are sufficiently
concrete.”46 The Federal Circuit wrote that “precision has been elusive
in defining an all-purpose boundary between the abstract and the
concrete” in finding patent ineligible a method of retaining
information when users navigate forms on the internet.47 The claims
failed to recite the mechanism used to retain the information—in

39. Id. at 218–19, 225 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 87–89 (2012)).
40. Id. at 225.
41. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 712 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
42. Id. at 715.
43. Id. at 715, 722 (Mayer, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 722.
45. Id. at 717 (majority opinion).
46. Procter & Gamble Co. v. QuantifiCare Inc., 288 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1011 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
47. Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
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other words, the tangibility of the claim was in question and eligibility
was not found.48 Overcoming the absence of a tangible or concrete
element has proven very difficult, and even with the presence of
elements that are concrete and tangible, such as a general-purpose
computer,49 scanner,50 or interface,51 many claims are unable to
overcome the barrier to patentability presented by the presence of an
abstract idea. The Federal Circuit found an intangible method of
recording and archiving digital images unpatentable, writing: “The
specification does not describe a new telephone, a new server, or a new
physical combination of the two . . . . [T]he claims are not directed to
a solution to a ‘technological problem’ . . . . Instead, the claims . . . are
simply directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital
images in an organized manner.”52 The claims at issue recited
tangible elements, such as a telephone, but the telephone was held to
be “merely a conduit for the abstract idea.”53 Distinguishing between
the terms tangible and abstract, the Federal Circuit found a method
abstract due to the lack of any “particular concrete or tangible form or
application.”54 However, if concrete and tangible do not mean the
same thing, then what exactly is the opposite of tangible? A claim
“that recites concrete, tangible components” can still be abstract.55
Abstract is not a synonym for intangible.
Again addressing the patent-eligibility of intangible processes, the
Federal Circuit recently found that a process having “a concrete
assignment of specified functions,” was patent eligible.56 In their
decision, the Federal Circuit referred to an earlier decision in which
the patent-eligible software yielded “a tangible technological
benefit.”57 Each of these processes transformed the nature of the claim
into a patent-eligible medium.58 However, of course, a method claim
that recites a concrete and tangible component may still not be
48. Id. at 1347–48.
49. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 223–24 (2014).
50. Content Extraction & Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l. Ass’n,
776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
51. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Serv. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
52. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612–13 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
53. Id. at 612.
54. Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP America, Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
55. Id.; see In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d at 611.
56. Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC America, Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2018), as amended, (Nov. 20, 2018).
57. Id. at 1350 (citing Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Semantic Corp., 838 F.3d
1307, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
58. Id.
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transformed into patent-eligible subject matter—but it certainly
helps.59 Our judicial system, despite the neutrality of the Patent Act,
remains determined to differentiate between the tangible and the
intangible, continuing to emphasize the importance of Industrial Age
technology in the Information Age.
C. A Patent System Cemented in the Industrial Age
“An idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it
may be made practically useful is.”60 The Supreme Court thus
differentiated in 1874 between the tangible implementation, which
the Court held obvious, and the intangible idea, which the Court found
not to be patent eligible.61 This decision fit in with the actuality that
most patents granted in the Industrial Age tended to include the
tangible, as acknowledged by Justice Kennedy, even when claiming
intangible methods.62 Applying the Patent Act of 1836, where the
word “art” was used to refer to what is now called a “process,” the
Supreme Court wrote that it was “not easy to give a precise definition
of what is meant by the term ‘art,’ as used in the acts of Congress.”63
Art was then held to apply “’to all those cases where the application
of a principle is the most important part of the invention, and where
the machinery, apparatus, or other means, by which the principle is
applied, are incidental only and not of the essence of his invention.’”64
The application of a principle, of course, imagines that the art will
have a tangible element to it. This tangibility requirement arose again
in a later opinion holding that “[a] process is a mode of treatment of
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and
reduced to a different state or thing.”65 In 1890, the leading patent
treatise of the era wrote that “An art or operation is an act or a series
of acts performed by some physical agent upon some physical object,

59. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014) (“We hold
that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement,
and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
823 F.3d at 611 (“However, not every claim that recites concrete, tangible components
escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry.”).
60. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
61. Id.
62. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010).
63. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 130 (1853).
64. Id.
65. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
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and producing in such object some change either of character or of
condition. It is also called a ‘process.’”66
Thomas Jefferson, the first United States Commissioner for
Patents, believed that patent-eligible subject matter should be limited
“to particular machines, not to all possible applications or uses of
them.”67 This long history tying tangible outcomes to the patentability
of intangible processes has proven difficult to overcome in the
Information Age.68 Judge Dyk goes into a detailed history of the
definition of “process” as used in 35 U.S.C. § 101 in his dissent from
In re Bilski, concluding that:
There is no suggestion in any of this early
consideration of process patents that processes for
organizing human activity were or ever had been
patentable. Rather, the uniform assumption was that
the only processes that were patentable were
processes for using or creating manufactures,
machines, and compositions of matter.69
Firmly cementing itself in the Industrial Age patent system, the
Supreme Court subsequently wrote:
[The Information] Age puts the possibility of
innovation in the hands of more people and raises new
difficulties for the patent law. With ever more people
trying to innovate and thus seeking patent protections
for their inventions, the patent law faces a great
challenge in striking the balance between protecting
inventors and not granting monopolies over
procedures that others would discover by independent,
creative application of general principles.70
Despite this historical emphasis on how processes contain
tangible elements, these opinions do not limit what processes are
patent eligible—they only point out how broadly processes can be
66. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 159 (1890).
67. DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 284 (1951).
68. See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J.,
dissenting). (“[T]he patent system is directed to tangible things and procedures, not
mere ideas.”).
69. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring).
70. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010).
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claimed—and emphasize that the difficulty in understanding what a
process is might be allayed when the process is tied to a tangible
element.71 The very neutrality of the language of section 101 makes it
clear that ideas can be patented not in and of themselves, but a
process is an idea, and its patent-eligibility should be determined
absent an evaluation of its tangible elements.
D. Information Age Intangibility
Patent infringement has changed as technology has advanced. In
the Industrial Age of technology, innovations were tangible and
present—often in the same room as the infringer. The means of
controlling access to the technology might have been as simple as
isolating the room where the technology is located72 or placing the
technology under lock and key.73 Today, the technology may be in
another country, rendering technology more difficult to protect and
infringement more challenging to define. Even something as simple
as reading a book has changed dramatically.74 The Industrial Age
patent system is designed to protect the tangible e-reader, but the
current implementation of the system does not adequately protect the
intangible advances that allow the e-reader to store documents on a

71. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
72. See, e.g., Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. H. Griffin & Sons Co., 29 F.2d 646, 648 (2d
Cir. 1928) (The technology at issue was partitioned off from the rest of the factory,
isolated, and “[a]ccess . . . was possible only by crossing a bridge between two
buildings.”).
73. See JAMES D. NORRIS, R.G. DUN & CO., 1841-1900: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CREDIT-REPORTING IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 53–54 (1978) (In order to access the
Dun & Bradstreet Reports, purchasers in 1859 had to agree to keep the reports “on the
designated premises of the firm, in a secure place . . . and to keep the information
confidential.” The volumes were further “equipped with lock and key.”).
74. See, e.g., Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 553, 556–
57 (D. Del. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 626 F.
App’x. 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
The patents are directed to systems, devices, and methods for
enabling the transmission and storage of document references or
“tokens,” each of which is associated with an electronic document
stored in a database. This enables mobile users to access all of their
electronic documents without being limited by the memory
available on a mobile device. The electronic document references,
which identify electronic documents stored in a database, can be
passed back and forth between the central database and the
portable device, or between the portable device and other devices.
A device can use the electronic document reference to request
delivery of the full electronic document from the database.
Id. (citations omitted).
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central server.75 The next wave of innovation is intangible, and it is
time for the patent system to recognize and embrace the patentability
of the intangible.76
E. Intangible Does Not Mean Abstract
Abstract ideas are not patent-eligible subject matter.77 Intangible
innovations are not necessarily abstract and so should not be painted
with the broad brush of patent ineligibility. There is no simple test for
determining what abstract subject matter is78—in the same way that
there is no simple test for determining how broad or narrow a claim
is.79 Not everything intangible is abstract, and not everything abstract
is intangible. A method or a process is intangible, yet James Diehr
was awarded a patent for a “method of operating a rubbermolding press for precision molded compounds with the aid of
a digital computer.”80 James Diehr’s patent was directed towards a
way of performing a series of steps—hardly something one can hold in
one’s hand. However, this method, directed as it is, to the tangible art
of curing and molding rubber (creating something that can be held),

75. Id. at 556.
76. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent
Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319 (2015).
77. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This Court has undoubtedly
recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory
terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas.”). In fact, Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have said that,
out of the judicially-created exceptions, “the most significant remaining exception is
the rule against the patenting of abstract ideas.” Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1642 (2003).
78. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014) (“[W]e need
not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”).
79. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 62 (1853). In O’Reilly, where the
USPTO issued a claim to Morse reading:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts
of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims;
the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of
the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism,
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters,
signs or letters at any distances, being a new application of that
power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
Id. The Supreme Court determined that the claim was too broad and, therefore, not a
valid claim, stating that to grant legal force to an overly broad claim is to allow the
patentee to “prevent[] others from attempting to improve upon the manner and
process which he has described in his specification—and may deter the public from
using, it, even if discovered.” Id. at 120–21.
80. U.S. Patent No. 4,344,142 col. 7 l. 1 (issued Aug. 10, 1982).
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was found by the Supreme Court not to be abstract.81 As the Supreme
Court stated: “In contrast, the respondents here do not seek to patent
a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a
process of curing synthetic rubber.”82 A mathematical formula is
intangible, as is a process for curing rubber, but only one is abstract.83
A patent for a method of preparing steel for painting was held
patentable over the argument that it was an unpatentable principle.84
Holding that “[t]he invention consists in the subjection of a specific
object to the influence of a specific force through a specific mode of
application,” the Delaware District Court found that this was “a true
process or art, as distinguished from a principle or effect, and as such
is within the scope of the patent act, and consequently is patentable
subject-matter.”85 Again, relying on the tangible outcome of the
process, the court found the intangible method patentable.
This lack of delineation between the abstract and the intangible
is firmly entrenched in United States Patent Law. All claims are
abstract to a certain extent—and yet the vast majority of claims are
claiming the tangible.86 In 1972, the Supreme Court decided
Gottschalk v. Benson, which raised the question of whether a “method
for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary
numerals” was patent-eligible subject matter.87 Benson’s intangible
claim to an abstract idea was held not to claim patent-eligible subject
matter.88 The main concern of the Supreme Court was the nature of
the claim that was “so abstract and sweeping” as to fully preempt any
other use of the algorithm in question.89 The Supreme Court
highlighted the lack of a tangible nature to the claim—writing that
the claim in question could be performed without a computer and was,
at its very essence, an abstract algorithm.90 In briefly laying out the
history of patent-eligible intangible processes, Justice Douglas
highlighted the tangible aspects of that history. 91 Justice Douglas

81. Diamond, 480 U.S. at 184–85.
82. Id. at 187.
83. Id. at 185 (“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”).
84. Am. Chem. Paint Co. v. C.R. Wilson Body Co., 298 F. 310, 311 (D. Del. 1924).
85. Id.
86. See Alan L. Durham, The Paradox of “Abstract Ideas,” 2011 UTAH L. REV.
797, 843–44 (2011).
87. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
88. Id. at 68.
89. Id. at 68, 71–72.
90. Id. at 67.
91. Id. at 67–71.
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stated that precedent demonstrated that a process claim could qualify
as patent eligible, if it was “tied to a particular machine or apparatus
or operate[d] to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or
thing.’”92 However, the Supreme Court went on to state that it did not
intend to “freeze process patents to old technologies, leaving no room
for the revelations of the new, onrushing technology,” but
acknowledged that if software was to be patentable, then
“considerable problems are raised” and suggested that “considered
action by the Congress is needed.”93
A few years later, the Supreme Court was again faced with the
question of how to patent the intangible. In Parker v. Flook, the
question was the patentability of a mathematical algorithm used
during the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.94 Tied to the
field of hydrocarbons, Flook’s invention was neither as abstract nor as
sweeping as Benson’s claim.95 The Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he
line between a patentable ‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is
not always clear,” but that any “notion that post-solution activity, no
matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over
substance.”96 In other words, the abstract can remain abstract, even
if it claims a tangible element. Flook may have sought to limit the
scope of his idea, but it remained unpatentable.97 Finally, the
Supreme Court wrote:
Neither the dearth of precedent, nor this decision,
should therefore be interpreted as reflecting a
judgment that patent protection of certain novel and
useful computer programs will not promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, or that such
protection is undesirable as a matter of policy.98
Diehr, Benson, and Flook continue to find support in the modern
Supreme Court and at the Patent Office. In January 2019, the PTO
announced that all examiners reviewing claims that recite judicial
exceptions must evaluate “whether the claim recites additional

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 71, 73.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
Id. at 589–90.
Id. at 589, 590.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
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elements that integrate the identified judicial exception into a
practical application.”99 The “practical application” language comes
straight from Justice Douglas’s opinion in Benson, where the claim
was found unpatentable because “[t]he mathematical formula
involved . . . has no substantial practical application.”100
The test of patentability does not turn on the tangibility of the
invention—there is no statutory requirement of tangibility. In
patenting the intangible, the patentee may be seeking to patent the
abstract, but that is not a given. And simply because the patentee is
seeking to patent the intangible does not statutorily or judicially
subject the patent to heightened scrutiny. Intangibility does not
“doom the claims” as can be seen from the patentability of method
claims.101 For example, a method of obtaining “seismograms which
delineate with a high degree of precision the nature of the subsurface
formations in the earth’s crust”102 has been held patentable, as has a
method of identifying patients at risk of ventricular tachycardia by
analyzing electrocardiographic signals.103 A method of handling
audio/video source information was later found to be obvious but was
not challenged for lack of subject matter eligibility.104 An intangible
claim is not necessarily an abstract claim, and the distinction needs
to made not on whether what is claimed is tangible or not but on
whether what is claimed is abstract.
F. Intangible Manufacture
In 2007, the Federal Circuit reviewed the patent eligibility of a
patent claiming a method of sending a signal with a digitally
embedded watermark, a device for sending the signal, a storage
medium holding the signal containing the watermark and the signal

99. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Announces Revised Guidance for
Determining Subject Matter Eligibility, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/us-patent-and-trademark-officeannounces-revised-guidance-determining-subject.
100. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
101. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]hat
the improvement is not defined by reference to ‘physical’ components does not doom
the claims.”).
102. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
103. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
104. See Method for Handing Audio/Video Source Information, U.S. Patent No.
5,164,839 (issued Nov. 17, 1992).
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itself.105 The only claims on appeal before the Federal Circuit were
those claiming the actual signal.106 The Patent Office rejected the
claim as an abstract idea—one with no “physical attributes” and, also,
for not fitting into any of the patent-eligible subject matter categories
of § 101.107 The Federal Circuit found that the claims on appeal
covered only transitory signals and held that physical, but transitory,
signals were not patent eligible as they are neither process nor
product.108 In its discussion of whether a signal was a manufacture or
not, the Federal Circuit held that a manufacture must be tangible in
nature.109 In finding the signal not to be patent eligible, the Federal
Circuit referred to the fleeting nature of the signal and the lack of any
“semblance of permanence during transmission.”110 In determining
whether a signal is patent eligible, the Federal Circuit seems to have
turned to § 102 of the Copyright Act, rather than § 101 of the Patent
Act. Under the Copyright Act, only “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression” are copyright eligible.111 A
work is “fixed” when its embodiment is not merely transitory.112 The
requirements that the signal be tangible and non-transitory are
requirements normally associated with copyright law and not with
patent law. Judge Linn dissented in part, stating that he disagreed
with limiting the definition of manufacture to “non-transitory,
tangible things.”113 A few years later, the Federal Circuit went on to
hold that “[d]ata in its ethereal, non-physical form is simply
information that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible
subject matter under section 101.”114
Intangible products may not meet the requirements of § 101
because they lack utility due to an absence of function or because they
do nothing more than embody abstract ideas. Intangible
manufactures, however, should have the chance to show that they are

105. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
106. Id. (Claim 14, the only independent claim to the signal read: “A signal with
embedded supplemental data, the signal being encoded in accordance with a given
encoding process and selected samples of the signal representing the supplemental
data, and at least one of the samples preceding the selected samples is different from
the sample corresponding to the given encoding process.”).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1352.
109. Id. at 1356.
110. Id.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
113. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1358–59 (Linn, J., dissenting in part).
114. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
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more than abstract ideas and have function. In other words, they
should be given the same treatment given tangible manufactures and
first be evaluated as patent eligible subject matter. The signal in
Nuijten is intangible, but it takes an input material, a signal, and adds
a watermark, giving the signal a new form, new qualities, and new
properties.115 There are many difficulties with protecting intangible
innovations, but rendering intangible innovations unpatentable as a
class is a far too narrow interpretation of a manufacture under § 101.
II. LEGISLATING THE INTANGIBLE
Intangible advances in technology are essential to business today.
Protecting such advances through the Industrial Age patent system
is difficult. Numerous intangible innovations are new ways of
performing well-known tasks, raising patent eligibility questions
outside the issue of subject matter, yet these questions remained
focused on the intangible innovations.116 What is patent eligible
subject matter should be at the heart of the discussion—and the
difficulty with answering that question is the focus of this section of
the article.
Methods of doing or conducting business are intangible and vital
in the way they are shaping patent policy today. It was not always
clear that business methods were patent eligible subject matter. With
the increase in importance of computers and software, innovators
sought protection for their ideas.117 Copyright law was a poor fit,

115. Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1358–59 (Linn, J., dissenting) (citing Am. Fruit Growers,
Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).
116. One notorious example of such innovation was the patent received by
Amazon for its “1-Click® ordering” system. This system allowed customers to purchase
items with one click and, by relying on stored information, avoid the shopping cart
checkout system typical of the Internet buying experience. Many argued at the time
that the patent should not have been issued because it was neither novel nor nonobvious. Regardless, Amazon received the patent, licensed it to others, and enforced it
in court. The innovation is often cited as one of the reasons Amazon’s business grew
as large as it did. Keith Collins, A Patent that Helped Amazon Take Over Online
Commerce Is About to Expire, QUARTZ (Aug. 19, 2017), https://qz.com/1057490/apatent-that-helped-amazon-take-over-online-commerce-is-about-to-expire/.
117. Software developers struggled to find a way to protect their innovations.
Using contracts to augment intellectual property protection first gained popularity
with the use of software licenses at a time when statutory protection for software was
close to non-existent. See, e.g., Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d
1075, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Historically, the purpose of ‘licensing’ computer program
copy use was to employ contract terms to augment trade secret protection in order to
protect against unauthorized copying at a time when, first, the existence of a copyright
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contracts require privity, and so innovators sought protection for their
methods from the patent system. In 1998, the Federal Circuit held
business methods patentable.118 Congress followed suit, codifying the
validity of business method patents in the First Inventor Defense Act
of 1999, stating that a “method of doing or conducting business” could
be infringed.119
Despite this affirmation, obtaining a patent on a business method
remains fraught with peril. A recent study looked at patent
prosecution in the Patent Office’s technology center, 3600BM,
encompassing computer-implemented business methods—in other
words, the genuinely intangible advances.120 The study found an
allowance rate of around 36% for this technology center,121 compared
with an overall allowance rate for patent applications of around
75%.122 Furthermore, the patent examiner with the single lowest
allowance rate, 1%, is an examiner in the business methods art.123
Part of the explanation for this difficulty comes from Congress’s
interest in business method patents. In the first decade after the
Federal Circuit held business methods patent eligible, industry filed
over 40,000 business method patent applications.124 When those
numbers were brought to the attention of Congress, alarm bells rang.
Senator Kyl stated, “the expectation [is] that most if not all true
business-method patents are abstract and therefore invalid.”125
Senator Schumer opined that “certain business method patents . . .
are generally of dubious quality because unlike other types of patents,
they have not been thoroughly reviewed at the PTO due to a lack of
the best prior art.”126 The America Invents Act (AIA) codified the

in computer programs was doubtful, and, later, when the extent to which copyright
provided protection was uncertain.”).
118. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
119. S. 1948, 106th Cong. § 273 (1999); see First Inventor Defense Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273
(2018)).
120. Mark S. Nowotarski, Surviving Alice with Big Data, 11 LANDSLIDE 56, 57–
58 (2018).
121. Id. at 61.
122. Chad Gilles, The Easiest and Most Difficult Patent Examiners—Allowance
Rate and Actions Per Disposal, BIGPATENTDATA (Mar. 29, 2019), https://bigpatent
data.com/2019/03/the-easiest-and-most-difficult-patent-examiners-allowance-rateand-actions-per-disposal/.
123. Id.
124. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
125. 157 CONG. REC. S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
126. 157 CONG. REC. S1364 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
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Covered Business Method (CBM) procedures in response to this
perceived “flood of poor quality business method patents and a cottage
industry of business method patent litigation.”127 Although the AIA
explicitly recognized the patentability of intangible business methods,
the CBM procedures provided another barrier to those seeking to
protect the intangible.128
Business methods are financial, non-technological advances—
clearly Information Age, intangible innovations. CBM procedures
provide an additional level of scrutiny for parties who believe that a
patent claiming “covered business method” has been infringed.129
Once a patentee has charged another with infringement, then the
interested party may file a petition with the Patent Office seeking a
review of the validity of the patent at issue.130 All patents are
presumed valid upon issuance.131 The covered business method
patentee is not entitled to the same presumption of validity as those
seeking to protect tangible advances in the art.132 CBM procedures
allow a party charged with infringement to ask the Patent Office to
review a CBM patent for validity, even once the patent has issued.133
A party to whom a patent claiming a covered business method has
been issued, and who wishes to protect that patent by suing an
infringer, may find themselves having to reprove the validity of their
issued patent, despite the presumption of validity carried by all
patents. In acknowledging the patentability of Information Age
technology, Congress discriminated between covered business
methods and tangible advances.
The lack of clarity in defining what aspects of Information Age
technology are patent eligible is not an issue peculiar to the United
States. In Japan, any “highly advanced creation of technical ideas
utilizing the laws of nature” is patent eligible.134 The Japan Patent

127. Id. at S1363; see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18,
125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011).
128. See 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2018). The AIA contains a sunset provision with respect
to CBM proceedings, and no new CBM petitions can be filed after September 16, 2020.
§ 18(a)(3), 125 Stat. at 330.
129. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31.
130. Id. at 329–30.
131. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2018) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
132. See § 18, 125 Stat. at 329.
133. Id.
134. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER:
REPORT ON VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC 18 (2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101-Report_FINAL.pdf (quoting
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Act then excludes explicitly “inventions that are liable to negatively
affect public order, morality, or public health” from patent
eligibility.135 The European Patent Convention (EPC) defines patenteligible inventions to be those “inventions, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
susceptible of industrial application.”136 The EPC then limits patent
eligible subject matter further, noting that specific categories,
including business methods, discoveries, scientific methods, and
computer programs, are not inventions, while plant and animal
varieties are not patent eligible subject matter.137
Following the lead of the EPC and Japan by codifying the
exceptions to patent eligibility for particular inventions would help
inventors of intangible innovators understand how to protect their
inventions.138 Amending the definitions outlined in § 100 would
mirror the approach taken by Japan and the EPC, allow the United
States to codify the guidelines set forth for United States patent
examiners, and retain the language of § 101, first drafted in 1793, that
has worked for over 225 years.
Currently, § 100 defines an invention as an “invention or
discovery.”139 Amending § 100 to delineate what an invention is would
reduce litigation costs, increase judicial efficiency, and make it easier
for Information Age innovators to make decisions about how to best
protect their innovations. The current diminished level of clarity as to

TOKKYO-Ho [Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 2, para. 1 (Japan)), translated at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/jp/jp206en.pdf.
135. Id.
136. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. of 5, October 1973, art.
52, [hereinafter EPC Rules], https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/
2016/e/EPC_conv_20191101_en_20191021.pdf.
137. Id.
138. In addition to the codified exceptions, the Japanese patent examiners have a
detailed list given to them of non-statutory inventions which are not patent eligible.
These guidelines contain a detailed list of excluded inventions. Under these guidelines,
the excluded categories are not a “creation of a technical idea utilizing the laws of
nature” and are, therefore, not statutory inventions. JAPAN PATENT OFFICE,
EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND UTILITY MODEL IN JAPAN pt. III, ch. 1,
§ 2.1.1 (2015) [hereinafter JAPAN GUIDELINES], translated at https://www.jpo.go.
jp/e/system/laws/rule/guideline/patent/tukujitu_kijun/document/index/all_e.pdf. In a
similar fashion, the guidelines issued to United States patent examiners state that
“claims directed to nothing more than abstract ideas (such as mathematical
algorithms), natural phenomena, and laws of nature are not eligible for patent
protection.” U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (M.P.E.P) § 2106.04 (9th ed. Mar. 2014) (latest revision Jan. 2018).
139. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2018).
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what is patent eligible yields unpredictable results, leaving patentees,
potential infringers, and investors uncertain as to whether a patent
issued today will be enforceable tomorrow.140 One expert
commentator wrote, “[i]t is simply ridiculous that after 40 years of
debate, we still do not have an answer to the simple question of
whether (or when) software is patentable.”141 The difficulties faced by
those seeking to patent business methods demonstrates the lack of
clarity inherent in the current patent system. Codifying a definition
of “invention” under § 100 would be of great benefit to all. Congress
should set forth a clear definition of an invention by amending 35
U.S.C. § 100(a) to read as follows:
The term “invention” means invention or discovery.
The following are not statutory inventions or
discoveries:
(i)
The
laws
of
nature
as
such
(ii) Mere discoveries and not creations, such as
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and natural
things
(iii) Those contrary to the laws of nature
(iv) Abstract ideas in which the laws of nature are
not utilized142

140. See, e.g., JOHN P. WALSH ET AL., Effects of Research Tool Patents and
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 294 n.13 (Stephen A. Merrill & Wesley M. Cohen eds., 2003) (“Some firms
have also begun concentrating on their most promising targets, because of the high
cost of maintaining patents and the low value of many . . . patents . . . that may not
give rights to downstream developments . . . .”).
141. Dennis Crouch, Ongoing Debate: Is Software Patentable?, PATENTLY-O (July
27,
2012),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/07/ongoing-debate-is-softwarepatentable.html/.
142. This language is based on the guidelines issued to Japanese patent
examiners. JAPAN GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at pt. III, ch. 1, § 2.1. In addition,
Senators Coons and Tillis and Representatives Collins, Johnson, and Stivers set forth
a proposed framework for a modified § 101 on April 17, 2019. The framework proposed
defining:
[I]n a closed list, exclusive categories of statutory subject matter
which alone should not be eligible for patent protection. The sole
list of exclusions might include the following categories, for
example:
Fundamental scientific principles;
Products that exist solely and exclusively in nature;
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Section 101 says that to be patent eligible an invention or
discovery must be useful but fails to define utility.143 Utility has long
been a requirement of the patent system, and as early as 1852, the
Supreme Court stated that to be patent eligible an innovation must
have a “practical result” and “special purpose.”144 Utility has never
meant just that the patent must work—indeed, PTO guidelines state
that all claimed inventions must have specific and substantial
utility—something more than merely “the use of a complex invention
as landfill.”145 When even the examiners struggle to understand what
it means to be useful, deciding whether the risk of allowance
outweighs the cost of disclosing trade secrets is a daunting
determination for an innovator to make. Codifying this requirement
will allow innovators to understand what is required to receive the
grant of a patent.146
Information Age innovations have been challenged for claiming
general purpose computers,147 abstract ideas,148 mental steps,149 and
failing to claim significant post-solution transformative elements.150
The Patent Office itself has acknowledged that “[t]he legal
uncertainty surrounding Section 101 poses unique challenges for the

Pure mathematical formulas;
Economic or commercial principles;
Mental activities.
Press Release, Coons.Senate.gov, Sens. Coons and Tillis and Reps. Collins, Johnson
and Stivers Release Section 101 Patent Reform Framework (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/sens-coons-and-tillis-and-repscollins-johnson-and-stivers-release-section-101-patent-reform-framework.
143. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
144. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (1 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
145. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MPEP § 2107, (9th ed. Jan. 2018).
146. A proposal to revise §§ 100 and 101 was released on May 22, 2019 by Senators
Tillis and Coons and Representatives Collins, Johnson, and Stivers. The proposed
legislation defines what it means to be “useful.” To be useful, an innovation must now
provide “specific and practical utility in any field of technology through human
intervention.” Press Release, Tillis.Senate. gov, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps.
Collins, Johnson and Stivers Release Draft Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the
Patent Act (May 22, 2019), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coonsand-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-ofthe-patent-act.
147. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
148. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
149. See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
150. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012).
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USPTO.”151 Codifying the requirement that an invention has
specific,152 substantial,153 and practical utility154 mitigates much of
that uncertainty by delineating what is patent eligible subject matter.
Ratifying hundreds of years of precedent, 35 U.S.C. § 100 should be
amended to include a definition of “useful” that reads as follows: “The
term ‘useful’ means the claimed invention has specific, substantial,
and practical utility.”
Specific utility requires proof that the benefit to the public of the
patent disclosure exceeds the mere use of the innovation as an “object
of scientific research.”155 The patent system is a balancing act between
the benefit received by the public from the patent disclosure and the
benefit to the patentee of receiving the exclusive right to prevent
others from unauthorized use of the invention for a limited time.
Specific utility reaffirms the fundamental nature of this bargain.156
By codifying the requirement that an invention has specific utility,
inventors claiming software implemented on a general purpose
computer may find their inventions rejected for lack of specific
utility.157 The focus shifts from whether the claim is an abstract idea
to the more fundamental question of “is the claim one that benefits
the public?” A general utility is one that applies to a broad class of
inventions—and software implemented on a general purpose
computer may have general utility (it works) but lack specific utility
in the absence of a disclosure of a particular computer or some other
transformative post-solution step. The codification of this language
clarifies the difficulties faced by those seeking Information Age

151. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019).
152. See, e.g., In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
153. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
154. In January 2019, the USPTO released guidelines directing examiners to
determine whether a claim that is directed to a judicial exception has “integrated the
exception into a practical application.” A “practical application” is further defined as
one that “will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
155. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966).
156. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371 (Specific utility requires the provision to the public
of a “well-defined and particular benefit.”).
157. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND.
L. REV. 1459 (2016) (The requirement of utility also allows for regulation of the timing
of an application—preventing those with the mere idea from patenting the invention
until it actually has been proven to work.).
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patents, but such clarity also offers insight into ways to better protect
those innovations as well.
The proposal detailed by this Article also requires inventions to
have practical utility.158 In reiterating the patentability of business
method patents, Judge Rich wrote that the question of patentability
should not turn on the four categories of subject matter outlined in §
101, but rather on “the essential characteristics of the subject matter,
in particular, its practical utility.”159 “’Practical utility’ is a shorthand
way of attributing ‘real-world’ value to claimed subject matter. In
other words, one skilled in the art can use a claimed discovery in a
manner which provides some immediate benefit to the public.”160
Setting forth a test for “practical utility” is considerably more difficult
than asking whether an invention works or not.161 Codification of this
requirement recognizes the already existing unwritten requirement.
In applying the “practical utility” test to intangible innovations, the
focus shifts from the question of whether the claim is a concrete
advancement, to the determination of what the benefit to the public
of the claim is. The practical application test was first used in 1849 by
the Northern District of New York Circuit Court in holding that “the
person who first reduces the idea to practical application and use is
entitled to the patent.”162 The claimed invention was a new
application of a principle—and the practical application of the idea
was held to be patentable.163 In 1852, the Supreme Court held that
“[a] new property discovered in matter, when practically applied, in
the construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture, is
patentable.”164 Practical and tangible are neither synonyms nor

158. In recognition of the many issues facing examiners of intangible Information
Age innovations, in January 2019 the Patent Office issued guidance to its examiners
on approaching eligibility issues under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Examiners were instructed to
use a two-step method before rejecting claims for lack of subject matter eligibility. If
the claim specifically recites subject matter that is proscribed by the defined categories
of “judicial exceptions” then the examiner is to determine whether the claim
“integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that exception.”
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
159. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
160. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
161. The earlier proposed framework stated that proposed legislation would
“[c]reate a ‘practical application’ test to ensure that the statutorily ineligible subject
matter is construed narrowly.” Coons.State.gov, supra note 142.
162. Foote v. Silsby, 9 F. Cas. 373, 381 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 4916), aff’d, 55
U.S. (1 How.) 218 (1852).
163. Id.
164. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
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antonyms. The Industrial Age decisions focused on timely practical
and tangible innovations. As the advances have shifted from the
Industrial Age to the Information Age, the over 150 years of case law
on what is a practical application contains many examples of practical
utility of intangible innovations.165
Defining invention and utility clarifies the bargaining process. A
patent is a bargain whereby the public grants the inventor a limited
set of rights in return for learning the intimate details of the
invention. With the constantly shifting background of patent
eligibility, and the substantial cost of obtaining a patent—both
monetary and informational costs—many Information Age innovators
are choosing to find other ways to protect their ideas and removing
the benefit from the public granted by the patent system. Amending
§ 100 allows the United States to utilize better the Industrial Age laws
to protect Information Age technology and upholds the patent bargain
for the public and the innovators.
III. PROTECTING THE INTANGIBLE
In 2007, Apple and Burst.com settled a lawsuit over infringement
of Burst.com’s patent portfolio by Apple. Burst.com patented a method
of faster-than-real-time transmission of data that paved the way for
Windows’ Media Player and Apple’s iPod.166 Burst.com’s patent
portfolio contained patents that received data, compressed the data,
and transmitted the data.167 The valuable technology involved in this
litigation was data. Downloading a movie from Netflix, a book from
Overdrive, or a song from iTunes involves transmitting compressed
data. It is without question that an intangible asset (a patent)
protecting intangible assets (data) has value. The question is how to
best protect that value and promote innovation through the patent
system.

165. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (holding that an
intangible method of curing and molding rubber articles which resulted in cured and
molded rubber was patentable).
166. See Katie Marsal, Apple Settles Burst.com Patent Suit for $10 Million,
APPLEINSIDER (Nov. 21, 2007, 7:55 PM), https://appleinsider.com/articles/07/11/21/
apple_settles_burst_com_patent_suit_for_10_million.
167. Id.
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A. Circumnavigating the Patent System
Innovation in the Information Age focuses on technology without
geographic boundaries. Industrial Age technology was restricted by
the location of the machinery and devices that made life more
comfortable. Today, life is made easier by the very erosion of the
geographic barriers that limit enforcement of § 271. In order to
infringe a United States patent, the infringer must avail themselves,
without permission, of the patented technology within the United
States.168 The patent boundaries of the United States delineate the
geographic reach of United States patent law. Outside these
boundaries, infringement under United States law cannot be found.169
Cloud computing, compartmentalization of technology, and the
eroding connection between geography and technology reveals the
flaws in the Industrial Age laws, as the intention behind the patent
system is frustrated by the judicial implementation of the patent
laws.170 It is time to ameliorate these discrepancies and to enforce the
purpose behind the patent system. If an invention is controlled from
within the United States, its financial benefits accrue within the
United States, and sufficient prefatory acts exist, then the invention
is being used within the United States and can be found to infringe
United States patents.
Burst.com’s patents claimed both the method of faster-than-realtime transmission and the means of performing the transmission.171
If Apple had stored the compressed data outside the United States,
then under the current interpretation of the patent laws, Apple would
not have infringed any method claim that included the step of storing

168. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2018).
169. See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650
(1915) (“The right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States
and its Territories and infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly
done in a foreign country.” (citation omitted)).
170. M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Ltd., 890 F.3d 995, 1008 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (“What is particularly troubling in this case is that if U.S. law does not apply
to infringing activity on a U.S.-flagged ship in international water, then it is possible
no law applies.”); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“It cannot be that the legislators intended to enable avoidance of
process patents by this ploy, while correcting it for machine patents. A statutory
interpretation that results in all process inventions being seriously devalued, is not
free of the charge of ‘absurd result.’”); Ocean Sci. & Eng’g, Inc. v. United States, 595
F.2d 572, 574 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (“Perhaps the patent bar will note the possible loophole in
the coverage of the U.S. patent laws and will invite the attention of Congress to it.”).
171. Marsal, supra note 166.
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the data.172 Burst.com’s patents would, accordingly, have been worth
considerably less, and perhaps the research and development put into
Burst.com’s technology would have been used for other purposes.
Contrast this potential outcome with the outcome under British
law. Dr. Julian Menashe received a patent claiming a networked
gaming system for an interactive casino game in which there were
multiple computers in different locations. 173 William Hill operated an
interactive casino game in which the networked gaming system
involved computers in multiple countries. 174 In the United Kingdom,
where Menashe sued Hill, the courts found that a user gambling at a
computer in the United Kingdom used the patented method for online
gambling in the United Kingdom, although the server accessed by the
gaming system was located overseas.175 The courts found that the
unauthorized use occurred within the United Kingdom patent
boundaries, regardless of the geographic boundaries of the location of
the server. 176
Consider a similar case under the United States patent system.
Rehncohl holds a patent on an invention using a communications
network to facilitate transactions between suppliers and
consumers.177 Rehncohl patented a method of facilitating such
transactions and the apparatus used to facilitate these
transactions.178 Various Canadian and Irish corporations operated
websites that use Rehncohl’s technology.179 Users within the United
States access the websites, but all data is maintained on international
servers.180 The domestic users execute transactions using
international resources benefiting by receiving information from the
international servers.181 Locating the code on international servers,
however, insulates the international corporations from charges of
infringement under United States patent law for the method of using

172. Apple has numerous Data Center Locations around the world, including in
the United States, Denmark, and Hong Kong. Apple Data Center Locations,
BAXTEL.COM, https://baxtel.com/data-centers/apple#locations (last visited Feb. 10,
2020).
173. Menashe Bus. Mercantile, Ltd. v. William Hill Organisation Ltd. [2002]
EWCA (Civ) 1702, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1462 (Eng.).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Renhcol, Inc. v. Don Best Sports, 548 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358 (E.D. Tex. 2008).
178. U.S. Patent No. 6,260,019 (issued July 10, 2001).
179. Renhcol, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 358–59.
180. Id. at 358.
181. Id. at 359.
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the system. 182 The system may be infringed in other ways, even with
part of the system located overseas, but the method of facilitating
transactions—using international servers controlled from the United
States and benefitting the domestic use—falls outside the United
States patent code.183 To allow such circumnavigation of the patent
boundaries hinders the progress of science and technology.
Geographic boundaries are imposing fewer restrictions on
Information Age innovations, frustrating the protections offered by
the patent system to patentees. The case law on extraterritoriality is
complicated, evolving, and murky.184 Courts analyzing patent
infringement impacted by extraterritoriality have chosen not to
address the issue of extraterritoriality,185 have relied on narrow issues
of statutory construction,186 or held that the actions took place
“outside of the territorial reach of any patent jurisdiction in the
world.”187 A straightforward standard is needed to eliminate
categories, set aside the patchwork blueprint for circumnavigating
United States patent boundaries, and delineate when a patented
method is used within the United States.188
Whoever without authority controls a patented method within the
United States and benefits domestically from that method is a
domestic user of that invention, regardless of whether the method
182. Id. at 366.
183. Id.
184. See infra Section IV.B.
185. See, e.g., Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017)
(focusing on the definition of component in § 271(f), rather than on what aspects of the
patent infringement occurred extraterritorially); Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 400 F. Supp. 2d 998 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(determining that a mobile offshore drilling rig was to be used in the Gulf of Mexico
but not addressing the question of whether such use actually was within the United
States and treating the location of the drilling rig as within the United States with no
discussion of the question of extraterritoriality).
186. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (discussing
the definition of component in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)).
187. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016).
188. Others have written about the concerns of applying United States law to
foreign activities. See, e.g., Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Note, Divided Infringement:
Expanding the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281 (2007). The
most straightforward standard would be to find that methods that are controlled
within the United States and where the benefit accrues within the United States are
within the United States for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). In the same breath, if one
step of a patented method occurs within the United States, but the benefit accrues
elsewhere, then no domestic use has occurred, and United States patent law does not
govern.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456255

2020]

INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY

513

covers the use of tangible or intangible assets. The consistent erosion
of patent boundaries has led to confusion, increased costs, and a
weakening of the patent system. It is time to strengthen the patent
system and give United States patentees the full protection of their
intellectual property rights.
B. Circumscribing the Patent System
The public policy behind the protection of intellectual property
seeks to balance competing interests. Traditionally, agreements
regulated the sharing of intellectual property itself, securing for the
owners of the intellectual property the exclusive right to control their
intellectual property as envisioned by the Constitutional Convention
of 1787.189 Patents are territorial rights, giving patentees the ability
to file for patents in different countries and to seek patent protection
where available. When the primary focus of innovation was tangible
in nature, such a strict interpretation of territoriality may have made
sense, but in the Information Age, such a rigid categorical reliance on
geographic boundaries makes little sense.
The territorial limitations in United States patent law evolved in
a time of patenting the tangible. In 1856, the Supreme Court wrote
that the U.S. patent laws “do not, and were not intended to, operate
beyond the limits of the United States.”190 At issue in Brown v.
Duchesne was a patented method of constructing boats.191 A French
schooner sailed, under the French flag, into Boston Harbor.192 The
schooner had been made in France using the method patented in the
United States.193 The patentee claimed infringement when the
schooner was in a United States port, even though the unauthorized
use of the method had occurred in France.194 The Supreme Court held
that on board a foreign-flagged ship in United States waters, the
patent laws of the country whose flag the ship flies apply.195
Not ten years later, in 1865, the question of patent boundaries
arose again.196 In Gardiner v. Howe, an American ship on the high

189. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
190. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857).
191. Id. at 184.
192. Id. at 193.
193. Id. at 188.
194. Id. at 188.
195. Id. at 198.
196. Gardiner v. Howe, 9 F. Cas. 1157, 1157 (C.C.D. Mass. 1865) (No. 5,219).
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seas engaged in the unauthorized use of a patented method.197 The
court found that “[t]he patent laws of the United States afford no
protection to inventions beyond or outside of the jurisdiction of the
United States.”198 However, the court held that unauthorized use of a
patented invention infringes a United States patent if the
unauthorized use occurs on “the decks of American vessels on the high
seas, as much as it does to all the territory of the country.” 199 The
“floating island” doctrine was thus born, wherein “[a] ship, which
bears a nation’s flag, is to be treated as a part of the territory of that
nation. A ship is a kind of floating island.”200 Therefore, under this
concept, any use of a patented invention on a United States-flagged
ship occurs within the United States.
In 1943, the United States government engaged in the
unauthorized use of a patent after purchasing and using radio
receivers from the Marconi Wireless Telephone Company of
America.201 A number of patents covered the receivers, and during the
term of the patent, the United States manufactured and built radio
receivers without authorization.202 Ten such receivers were
assembled and used at the United States Naval Radio Station at the
American Legation in Peking.203 This use was found to be within the
United States.204
Relying on territoriality, Deepsouth Packing found a way to
circumvent patent boundaries after it was found to have infringed
Laitram’s patent on a machine for deveining shrimp.205 Deepsouth
Packing made parts of the deveining machines in the United States,
then sold the parts to foreign buyers along with instructions on how
to assemble the machines once outside the United States.206 The

197. Id.
198. Id. at 1158.
199. Id.
200. Patterson v. Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 176 (1903) (citations omitted).
201. The patent infringement suit specifically addresses the time period from
“March 8, 1913, when plaintiff first gave notice of infringement to the defendant, to
August 16, 1915, when the patent expired.” Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United
States, 99 Ct. Cl. 1, 5 (1942), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 320 U.S.
1 (1943).
202. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am., 99 Ct. Cl. at 5.
203. Id. at 38.
204. Id. at 68.
205. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 523–24 (1972).
206. Id. at 523 n.5 (“Deepsouth is entirely straightforward in indicating that its
course of conduct is motivated by a desire to avoid patent infringement. Its president
wrote a Brazilian customer:
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Supreme Court held that this was not an unauthorized use within the
United States and, therefore, no infringement of Laitram’s patent
occurred by Deepsouth’s exportation.207 Congress amended the patent
code in 1984 to render such behavior infringement under § 271.208
Each of the above scenarios involved tangible aspects of the
alleged infringement. In 1979, the validity of the doctrine of the
“floating island” was challenged in the United States Court of Claims
in a case alleging infringement of an intangible invention.209 Bascom
patented a method of finding underwater objects.210 The United
States government used Bascom’s patented technology without
authorization on the high seas, outside the territorial reach of the
United States.211 The Court of Claims suggested that if the Patent Act
was strictly construed, such use might not be found to be within the
United States, and recommended that the “patent bar . . . note the
possible loophole in the coverage of the U.S. patent laws and . . . invite
the attention of Congress to it.”212 The Information Age nature of the
invention was explicitly highlighted by the language of the court in
addressing the intangible processes carried out. Bascom was denied
relief on other grounds, leaving the question of the floating island
doctrine out to sea. 213
Congress has historically recognized the territorial nature of
patent law and the accompanying limitations. In an age of continually
‘We are handicapped by a decision against us in the United States.
This was a very technical decision and we can manufacture the
entire machine without any complication in the United States, with
the exception that there are two parts that must not be assembled
in the United States, but assembled after the machine arrives in
Brazil.’
(citation omitted)”).
207. Id. at 527 (“[I]t is not an infringement to make or use a patented product
outside of the United States . . . [T]o secure the injunction it seeks, Laitram must show
a § 271(a) direct infringement . . . that Deepsouth ‘makes,’ ‘uses,’ or ‘sells' the patented
product within the bounds of this country.” (citations omitted)).
208. See 130 CONG. REC. H10525 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
209. Ocean Sci. Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Eng’g, 595 F.2d 572, 574 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (In
addressing the floating island doctrine, the Court of Claims stated, “Perhaps the
patent bar will note the possible loophole in the coverage of the U.S. patent laws and
will invite the attention of Congress to it. Meanwhile, it is well to adjudicate cases on
other grounds when possible . . . .”); see also Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d
1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
210. Ocean Sci. Eng’g, 595 F.2d at 573.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 574.
213. Id. at 584.
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eroding geographic boundaries, the argument could be made that
given all the repeated codified expansions and limitations to the
territorial reach of patent law, those areas left unaddressed must lie
outside the patent boundaries. The numerous changes and
amendments to the patent system reflect the fact that patent
boundaries have expanded over time while technology has,
simultaneously, eroded geographic boundaries.214
The policies behind the protection of intellectual property do not
support the enforcement of patent boundaries when the boundaries
are being used primarily to frustrate public legislation. Patentees
suffer the effects of such maneuvers. Patent law is inherently
territorial, and boundaries have a role in the commercialization of
intellectual property and products that embody intellectual property.
However, a balance must be struck between the territorial limitations
on the enforcement of patent law and protecting the public’s interest
in the promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts. The
law needs to be applied as the policies behind it dictate, and patentees
need to know what the boundaries are. A patented invention
controlled from within the United States, and accruing domestic
benefit, is used within the United States, even if it is only available
for use and the actual use will take place, outside the traditional
patent boundaries.215
Whether the actions at question are over land, under sea, or
geographically distant, if the action was controlled from within the
geographic limits of the United States, and the benefit accrues within
the United States, then the invention is being used within the United
States. Those who seek to avoid charges of unauthorized use, not the
patentees themselves, are setting the norms. Maintaining a balance
between the public’s interest in access to technology, and the
patentee’s interest in controlling that access promotes the progress of
science and the useful arts. Circumnavigating and circumscribing
patent boundaries raises numerous concerns and must be limited in
its reach.
There is presently a divide in the way that the courts evaluate
extraterritoriality in method claims, system claims, and machine
claims. Many patents include both method and apparatus claims, and

214. For example, Congress responded to the Court’s Deepsouth decision in 1984
by codifying as infringement the exportation of the components of a patented invention
for indirect infringement internationally. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2018). In 1988,
Congress codified as infringement the importation of a product made internationally
by a domestically patented process, subject to certain limitations. Id. § 271(g).
215. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 239–41 (1993).
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patentees often assert both together, but even so, it is time to put an
end to that divide and ask not what type of claim was drafted, but
where the patented invention was used.216 An invention is used in the
location from where it is controlled and where it derives the benefit.217
If a patented process is practiced so that some steps are performed
domestically and some steps are not, then it cannot be that the
practitioner can be found not to be using the invention in any country.
The Supreme Court has written that patent infringement under
United States law cannot be found when the acts predicating the
finding of infringement are “wholly done in a foreign country.”218
However, when steps occur within and outside the United States, then
the unauthorized use does not wholly occur in any one country. To
find no liability under domestic patent law devalues domestic method
patents.219 If an unauthorized use is controlled from within the United
States and the benefit accrues within the United States, then the use
takes place within the United States.

216. Before the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, the Seventh Circuit
addressed an analogous issue of divided enforcement in General Foods Corporation v.
Carnation Company. 411 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1969). In Carnation, the patented method
was used in one district, while sales of the product were made in another district. Id.
at 530. Carnation argued that just as each claim must be considered separately for
validity and infringement, venue must also be determined separately with respect to
each claim. Id. The Carnation court wrote that:
To hold as Carnation would have us do would create an intolerable
situation. It would mean that an action for patent infringement in
a situation such as we have here would be tried piecemeal, some
claims in one jurisdiction and others in another. Confusion would
be engendered and a multiplicity of suits invited.
Id. at 532. The analogy holds true when a court finds that system and machine claims
are used domestically, while method claims are not. It is true that patent law is
territorial. However, this division leads to a madness, whereby claims granted
protection by the Patent Office are, in fact, practiced under no legal regime or, even
more confusingly, under a mixed regime, whereby one country’s laws apply to one
aspect of an invention and another country’s laws govern a different aspect of the same
invention.
217. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“The use of a claimed system . . . is the place at which the system as a whole is put
into service, i.e., the place where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use
of the system obtained.”).
218. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915).
219. See, e.g., Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (noting that “[a]
statutory interpretation that results in all process inventions being seriously devalued
is not free of the charge of ‘absurd result.’”).
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1. Origins of the Control and Benefit Test
In 1958, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decided Bac v.
Loomis.220 The technology at issue involved a system for determining
the location of a moving craft using two fixed points, and radio signals
transmitted between the fixed points and the craft.221 An early test of
the invention involved setting up radio transmitting stations at
Montauk, Long Island, and Fenwick Island, Delaware, and a
monitoring station at Manahawkin, New Jersey.222 An aircraft in
Bermuda was then tracked using signals sent from New York and
Delaware.223 Similar tests were run using stations located in the
United States and Canada.224 The Patent Office Board of Patent
Interferences (Board), upon hearing the facts of the case, stated that:
We are inclined to view the operation of an integrated
instrumentality, a substantial portion of which is
within the United States, and which is operated by
and for residents of the United States, as not removed
from the United States by reason of the projection of
some elements of the instrumentality beyond the
political boundaries of the United States because of
the space requirements of the instrumentality in its
field of practical application.225
Neither the Board nor the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
upon appeal, went further with this inquiry, deciding the case on
other grounds.226 The invention, controlled from within the United
States, was found to be within the United States, despite the location
of the craft outside the United States.227 This precedent establishes
the idea that patent sovereignty and the accompanying patent
boundaries can be extended to inventions controlled from the United
States, even when such inventions are both within and without the
United States.
220. Bac v. Loomis, 252 F.2d 571 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
221. Id. at 572.
222. Id. at 574.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Rosen v. NASA, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 757, 767 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 30, 1966)
(quoting prior interference involving Patent No. 2,419,525).
226. Id. (citing Bac, 252 F.2d at 577).
227. See id.
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A few years later, in Decca, the United States was accused of
patent infringement of a radio-based navigation system.228 The
navigation system worked by broadcasting radio signals to aircraft
and ships, allowing each craft to determine its location and navigate
from there. 229 The United States anticipated using the navigation
system worldwide, but at the time of the infringement suit had only
three broadcast stations for use with the system: two based in the
United States and one based in Norway.230 The craft receiving the
signals were not necessarily within the United States. The question
before the court was whether the system was used within the United
States, and therefore potentially infringing the patent.231 In
answering the question, the court realized that there were different
ways to find United States patent sovereignty.
The alleged infringing navigation system transmitted signals to
ships and aircraft bearing the United States flag.232 The Court of
Claims declined to apply the “law of the flag” to the unauthorized use,
stating, in dicta, that they thought “a decision founded on the fiction
that for purposes of the Patent Laws, United States ships and planes
wherever found, are United States territory, would be founded on
water.”233
However, the court went on to discuss the question of control.
Extending the line of cases addressing United States patent
sovereignty, the Court of Claims found that a master broadcasting
station controlled the navigation system.234 The master broadcasting
station, located in Washington, D.C., monitored all stations,
worldwide, and, thus, according to the court, “the necessarily
scattered and changing position of receivers, with those actually
functioning for the most part at sea, in or over the territory of no
sovereign, have [no] necessary connection with the location of the . . .
system for purposes of the United States Patent Laws.”235
[T]he whole . . . system must be deemed . . . to be a
unity and the location of that unity must be deemed to
be in United States territory. Here it has planted
228. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
229. Id. at 1074.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1072–73.
232. Id. at 1072.
233. Id. at 1074; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art.
94, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
234. Id. at 1074–75.
235. Decca Ltd., 544 F.2d at 1074.
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several of its feet, and use of United States territory is
indispensable to it. The location of facilities in some
foreign countries is also essential to the plan, but the
selection of any single other country is, apparently, not
essential. Any one such country could readily be
abandoned for another.236
Once again, the patent boundaries were measured by the location
from where the invention was controlled, not the location of the actual
invention itself.
Continuing in the line of extraterritoriality and Information Age
technology, in Rosen v. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the invention in question was the subject of a patent
application entitled Method and Apparatus for Orienting a
Satellite.237 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) awarded Hughes a contract to build satellites incorporating
the invention.238 At no point before filing for a patent was the
invention reduced to practice since satellites using the invention
“could not be made by Hughes or by anyone outside of Government,
and only by Government in a multimillion dollar venture.”239 The
invention had to be used in outer space in order to be actually reduced
to practice, given the claim language of the patent.240 Under the facts,
in this case, proof of actual reduction to practice within the United
States was required for patentability purposes.241 The court found
that the invention had been actually reduced to practice after NASA
launched a satellite incorporating the technology.242 “[A]t the time of
the successful orbital maneuvers, [said satellite] was irretrievably
located 22,000 miles in space and over South America.”243 Actual
reduction to practice had occurred—but had it occurred “within the
United States?”
The Patent Office Board of Patent Interferences (Board) found
that the satellite containing the invention had been controlled from
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, located in Maryland. 244 Thus,
the invention was controlled “within the United States” and the Board
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 1075.
Rosen v. NASA, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 757, 758 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 30, 1966).
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 768.
See id. at 760.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 768.
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viewed “the operation of . . . the satellite and its control point . . . as
not removed from the United States by reason of the satellite being
necessarily distant from the several states of the United States.”245 In
other words, as long as control remains within the United States, the
United States patent laws extend to the invention.246 Sovereignty and
the patent boundaries are determined by the location of the control
point, and not the location of the invention itself.
In 1973, Hughes sued the United States government for patent
infringement on their patent for a spacecraft control system. 247 At
issue was the liability of the government for multiple spacecraft used
in a variety of international projects.248 Although the spacecraft was
not operated within the domestic boundaries of the United States, the
United States government was found liable for infringement. 249
Two of the satellites were a joint project between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United States, built in Germany and
launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida.250 “NASA’s main role
following launch was to provide tracking and data acquisition services
during some phases of the mission.”251 After launch, “the attitude
control systems were first activated in space shortly after separation
from the launch vehicles.”252 The Court of Federal Claims found that
“NASA’s launch of both of the spacecraft constituted a use of the
patented invention.”253
A joint project between the United States and the European Space
Agency (ESA) to launch a series of satellites resulted in more charges
of infringement by Hughes.254 Two satellites were “designed and
constructed by NASA at Goddard Space Center” under this contract
and launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida.255 The Court of Federal
Claims found that NASA launched the satellite from Florida as part
of “a joint program and not as a disinterested party.”256 The launch
site was controlled by the United States, and the United States

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
See, e.g., id.
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 201 (Ct. Cl. 1993).
Id. at 243.
Id.
Id. at 228, 234.
Id. at 234.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 235–37.
Id. at 237.
Id.
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benefited from the satellite.257 These combined to make the use one
within the United States, even if the actual infringement did not occur
until outer space.258
The AMPTE UKS program provides an interesting contrast to the
Cape Canaveral launched satellites.259 The AMPTE UKS satellites
were built overseas under various agreements and launched by
NASA.260 NASA did not track the satellites nor did the United States
government receive any further benefit other than that of being part
of a joint project.261 The Court of Federal Claims found no
infringement within the United States as the satellite was only
temporarily present within the United States and, therefore, 35
U.S.C. § 272 provided a complete defense to a charge of
infringement.262
In another joint program, a satellite was built by the United
Kingdom and launched by NASA.263 The launch took place off the
coast of Africa but was tracked by engineers at Goddard Space Center
in Greenbelt, Maryland.264 The Court of Federal Claims found a
connection with the United States too tenuous for the spacecraft to
fall within United States patent boundaries.
“Use” has a broad definition, as Judge Turner wrote in the Hughes
decision.265 That breadth expands the patent boundaries of the United
States. Expansion is not unlimited, however. Focusing on the word
use, the court found that a “device may be ‘used’ in many different
ways, and all uses that rely on the teachings of a patent constitute
infringement.”266 The invention at issue here, an attitude control

257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 237–41.
260. Id. at 239.
261. Id. at 239–40.
262. Id. at 241.
263. Id. at 242.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 226 (“A device may be ‘used’ in many different ways . . . .”).
266. Id. at 226. Patent infringement suits against the government arise under 35
U.S.C. § 1498 and not under 35 U.S.C. § 271. Under § 1498:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or
manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action
against the United States in the United States Court of Federal
Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation
for such use and manufacture.
35 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456255

2020]

INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY

523

system for a satellite, “cannot be activated until the spacecraft
separates from the launch vehicle in space.”267 However, at the time
of the launch, the attitude control system must necessarily, due to the
nature of the invention, be present on the satellite.268 The Court of
Federal Claims found that the very presence of the invention may be
enough to bring the invention within domestic patent boundaries if
control and benefit remain within the United States.269
Technology has eroded geographic boundaries. Patentees face
unprecedented rates of encroachment on their intellectual property
rights. Unauthorized use is categorically determined to be either
domestic or not. Such strict categorization, when combined with the
erosion of technological boundaries, devalues the patent system. The
combination of control and benefit and a connection to the territorial
grounds of the United States bring the invention within the United
States patent boundaries and subject to United States sovereignty.
C. Resetting Patent Boundaries
Geographic boundary limitations have resulted in direct
limitations on the rights of patentees in a world that knows few
technological boundaries.270 These limitations have induced potential
infringers to expand the scope of their activities ever further, and
transactions that are controlled from the United States and benefit
those in the United States are characterized as extraterritorial
transactions. Bringing a suit for infringement when the site of the
infringement is unclear is an expensive gamble. Applying the
traditional normative justifications for the protection of patentees’
interest to such transactions can help determine where the
transactions are taking place, and, therefore, what laws apply.
Clarifying the location of the use will lead to less circumnavigation of
the patent boundaries. Allowing potential infringers to avoid the
United States patent laws by locating a server or a single step in
another country will have a chilling effect on risk-averse innovators
who are already struggling with the question of what is patent eligible

267. Hughes Aircraft Co., 29 Fed. Cl. at 226.
268. See generally id.
269. See id. at 226–27.
270. “As you read this there are about 2,000 satellites orbiting above our heads . . .
By 2025 as many as 1,100 satellites could be launching each year—up from 365 in
2018.” Tate Ryan-Mosley, et al., The Number of Satellites Orbiting Earth Could
Quintuple in the Next Decade, MIT TECH. REV. (June 26, 2019), https://www.
technologyreview.com/s/613746/satellite-constellations-orbiting-earth-quintuple/.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456255

524

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87.483

subject matter in the first place. Tailoring the inquiry to determine
why and how the invention is being used, where the innovation is
controlled from, and where the benefit of the invention is derived will
delineate the patent boundaries and more accurately reflect the
realities of the Information Age. Today’s intangible innovations flow
smoothly across geographic boundaries and raise many questions that
are more readily addressed in the world of tangible innovations. The
answers to those questions, however, should not be different based on
the tangible nature of the invention. Resetting the patent boundaries
to reflect the intentions behind the patent laws requires the
evaluation of several relevant factors:
• Where will the invention be perceived as being practiced by
the users?
• Does the unauthorized user know of the patent at the time of
the unauthorized use?
• What are the terms of the arrangement leading to the
question of whether the invention is being practiced within the
United States?
• What is the nature of the intellectual property and “the
character of the commercial embodiment”?271
• How is the pricing of the agreement structured, what aspects
are occurring where, and to whom does the financial benefit of the
invention accrue?272
• What is the commercial relationship between the site where
potential infringement could occur and the site where control of
the invention is retained?
• What is the established profitability of the invention; how
commercially successful is it, and what is its current popularity?

271. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion
Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
272. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873) (“[W]hen the patentee, or the
person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use,
he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that
use . . . That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received
all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that
particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without further
restriction . . . .”); cf. Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus. (In re Dak Indus.), 66 F.3d 1091,
1095 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Because we look to the economic realities of the agreement,
the fact that the agreement labels itself a ‘license’ and calls the payments ‘royalties’ . . .
does not control our analysis.”).
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These factors are discussed in the subsequent subsections.
1. Perception of Use
Where the user of the innovation perceives the innovation as being
used should factor significantly into the location of the use of the
innovation. To determine the perception of use, a court must ascertain
the intent of the parties in practicing the innovation, as well as the
location of the benefit received and the control over the invention.
Taken together, these reflect the perceived location of the innovation
and, therefore, guide the courts in delineating the nature and scope of
the use and determining which patent laws apply to the alleged
infringement.
If the location of the invention is unambiguous, then the courts
should apply the relevant laws, and treat the infringement as
domestic or international. It is common, however, particularly in the
realm of the intangible, for the location of the use of the innovation to
be challenging to determine and to differ from at least one parties’
characterization of the use. Even when a contract is expressly entered
into in another country, or steps are taken to locate elements of the
invention extraterritorially, the circumstances surrounding the use
may contradict the first interpretation of the invention’s situs,273 and
so courts must look to the substance of the use, not merely the strict
geographic constraints.
O’Brien patented a radio-based navigation system.274 The system
worked by broadcasting radio signals to ships and aircraft, allowing
each craft to determine its location and navigate from there.275 The
signals were sent from a device within the United States to a ship
bearing a United States flag via a broadcast tower in Norway.276 The
essence of the invention required that steps of the invention must take
place outside of the United States and that the method of using the
invention must involve steps outside the United States.277 The United
States Court of Claims determined that the invention was used within
the United States as the navigator receiving the signals was operating
within the United States and retaining the benefit of the invention.278

273. See generally Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (Ct. Cl.
1993); Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1074 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
274. Decca Ltd., 544 F.2d at 1074.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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The perception of use was that the benefit was retained within the
United States, and the court held that, despite having extraterritorial
components, the patented system was used within the United
States.279
The question of perception of use has been addressed by other
countries and can be informative as to the application here. As
discussed in Section 0 above, the United Kingdom courts found that a
user gambling at a computer in the United Kingdom used the
patented method for online gambling in the United Kingdom, despite
the fact that the server was located overseas.280 The overseas location
of the server was not apparent to the user, and all benefit reaped from
the unauthorized use occurred within the United Kingdom patent
boundaries, regardless of the geographic boundaries of the location of
the server. 281
In order to determine the location of the infringing use of the
invention, the court must apply both an objective and subjective
standard to determine where the user perceived the use to have
occurred, where the benefit accrued, and where control of the use
remained. The subjective nature may be difficult to determine from
the evidence, and the courts may be forced to extrapolate the
subjective nature from an evaluation of the relevant terms of the use.
Merely labeling a transaction as a domestic or international
transaction or use cannot control.
2. Knowledge of Patent
To use an invention within the United States, without
authorization, is to infringe the invention, even when such use is
innocent and the user lacks any knowledge of the patent. To be
vicariously liable for another’s unauthorized use of an invention, the
party who is responsible for another’s indirect infringement must
have known or must have been willfully blind of the existence of the
patent.282 To find an unauthorized use occurs within the United
States (when not every step occurs), or element of the patent exists
within the geographic boundaries of the United States, that same
heightened standard must apply. It is essential to distinguish
between those seeking to circumnavigate United States patent

279. Id.
280. Menashe Bus. Mercantile Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ)
1702 [33]–[35], [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1462 (Eng.).
281. Id. at [33]–[34].
282. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766, 768 (2011).
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boundaries and innocent parties. In order to find patent infringement
within the United States, when extraterritoriality exists, it is
reasonable to ask whether a potential infringer knew or should have
known of the patent at issue.283 Users should not be required to
perform an international patent search when practicing an invention
across territorial boundaries unless those users are seeking to
circumnavigate the territorial reach of United States patent law.
Vicarious liability can be found when an accused infringer took
“deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of
wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the
critical facts.”284 If a user knows, or should have known, of a United
States patent and takes steps to circumnavigate the protection of
United States patent laws, then that user should be held to the same
standard as one infringing the patent entirely within the United
States. Geographic boundaries are continually eroding, and patent
boundaries should not be held to the same rigid definitions as
geographic boundaries.
In 1993, the International Trade Commission (ITC) investigated
the importation of disk drives containing sputtered carbon coated
disks.285 In that investigation, the named respondents manufactured
sputtered carbon coated disks in the United States and shipped those
disks overseas for assembly into disk drives. 286 When respondents did
so, they did so with the knowledge that most of the assembled disk
drives would be imported into the United States, infringing U.S.
Patent No. Re 32,464.287 In a statement of the additional views of

283. In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., a recent vicarious liability case,
the Supreme Court took a number of things into account in reaching the determination
that the alleged infringer should have been aware of the United States patents on the
device. The Supreme Court looked at the fact that the patented device was “an
innovation in the U.S. market,” a “superior product,” and one for which sales “had been
growing for some time.” Id. at 770. The infringer was aware of this, having performed
“market research” and “gather[ed] information as much as possible.” Id. at 770–71.
The infringer then “cop[ied] all but the cosmetic features” of the patented device. Id.
at 771. In addition, the infringer copied an “overseas model” of the patented device
knowing “that the product it was designing was for the U.S. market” and “that
products made for overseas markets usually do not bear U.S. patent markings.” Id.
Finally, the infringer chose “not to inform the attorney from whom [the infringer]
sought a right-to-use opinion that the product to be evaluated was simply a knockoff
of [the patented device].” Id.
284. Id. at 769.
285. In re Certain Sputtered Carbon Coated Disks & Prods. Containing Same,
Including Disk Drives, Inv. No. 337-TA-350, USITC Pub. 2701, Inv. No. 337-TA-350
(May 27, 1993) [hereinafter 350 Investigation].
286. Id.
287. Id.
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three commissioners, the ITC wrote that there must be a nexus
between the unfair acts, such as patent infringement, that give rise to
jurisdiction under § 337, and the importation, sale for importation or
domestic sale after importation.288 The Commissioners wrote that in
order for the respondents who shipped the disks overseas to be held
responsible for the unfair act, the respondents must have known or
should have known that the goods would be subsequently exported to
the United States.289 In other words, whether the manufacturer of the
sputtered carbon coated disk drives was located within the United
States made no difference in the culpability of the manufacturer.290
Culpability instead depends on whether the manufacturer knew or
should have known that the manufacturer’s sale would lead to the
goods being domestically and unlawfully imported.291 Knowledge of
the patents supplies the nexus between the territoriality of the
unauthorized use and the situs of every step along the way.
Knowledge of the patent may also allow a party not to be an
unauthorized user of a domestic method. If post-publication a party
uses a method to create the disclosed invention, but before the patent
issues the party exports the product, then there is no unauthorized
use within the United States.292 Similarly, practicing a patented
method wholly abroad that would infringe within the United States,
and not importing the product of that process, even when the party is
enjoined from unauthorized domestic use, does not implicate United
States patent law.293 In each of these scenarios, the party used
knowledge of the patent to avoid unauthorized domestic use of the
technology but did not seek to circumvent domestic geographic
boundaries.
United States Patent No. 8,070,847 is directed to a method of
straightening patient’s teeth without using traditional metal
braces.294 The patented method requires taking an impression of the
patient’s teeth, creating a computer model of the impression, and
using a 3-D printer to print a series of retainers that are then worn by

288. Id. (providing additional views from Vice Chairman Watson and
Commissioners Anne E. Brunsdale and Carol T. Cranford).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
293. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 361 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
294. U.S. Patent No. 8,070,847 (issued Dec. 6, 2011).
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the patient to straighten her teeth.295 A dentist living within the
United States who takes an impression of her patient’s teeth, uploads
the impression to the internet, pays a Pakistani company to create a
computer model of the impression in Pakistan, downloads the
computer model, and prints the retainers in her domestic office should
be found to infringe the patent.296 Under NTP v. RIM, in order for this
to be an unauthorized use, every step must occur within the United
States.297 Such method exceptionalism cannot make sense.298 If the
dentist knows, or should know, of the patent and is intentionally
circumnavigating the domestic patent boundaries, then that creates
the nexus for unlawful domestic use. To find otherwise takes the teeth
out of United States patent law in the Information Age.
3. The Terms of the Agreement
The terms of the agreement should be carefully examined in
determining where infringement of the patent occurs. A transaction
that takes place in a foreign country but contemplates delivery of the
product into the United States is placing the patented invention on
sale within the United States.299 Such a sale, if unauthorized, is
infringement of the United States patent, even if the sale takes place
overseas. Similarly, a sale that occurs within the United States for a
device assembled abroad and sold internationally is not a sale under
United States patent law because the terms of the agreement dictate
delivery overseas and never contemplate the invention being brought
within the United States patent boundaries.300 The determining
factor is not the “location of the offer, but rather the location of the
future sale that would occur pursuant to the offer.”301 In each of these
scenarios, the terms of the agreement control the location of the
infringement. By analogy, if the terms of the agreement expressly
provide for control of the invention to be domestic and the benefit of

295. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
296. Id.
297. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
298. See Holbrook, supra note 15, at 1008 (“Notwithstanding the statute’s textual
neutrality, the courts created rules unique to claimed methods that do not have a
textual justification in the Patent Act itself.”).
299. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
300. M2M Sols. LLC v. Motorola Sols., Inc., No. 12-33-RGA, 2016 WL 70814, at
*20 (D. Del. Jan. 6, 2016).
301. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 617 F.3d at 1309.
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the invention to also remain within the United States, then the
invention should be considered to be used within the United States,
regardless of the location of the steps and device. Because this
example contemplates the use and not the sale, the terms should only
be examined for guidance but remain a critical part of the
determination when an intangible invention crosses geographic
boundaries.
Looking at this factor through the eyes of the dentist—if the
dentist performs, without authorization, a step or a series of steps
outside the United States geographic boundaries, the terms of the
agreement can help differentiate between the dentist contemplating
delivery of the final product within the United States and the dentist
contemplating delivery outside the United States. If the benefit is
domestic and the control over the device remains within the United
States, as dictated by the language of the transaction, then the
transaction should fall under the protection of the United States
patent system, regardless of the location of each step along the way.302
The terms of the agreement dictate the location of the sale of an
article, and, by analogy, they should also provide guidance as to the
location of the use of the article. A method may be used across
geographic boundaries. 303 If such use is governed by terms and
conditions that dictate that the benefit is contemplated to be domestic,
and that control remains within the geographic boundaries of the
United States, then the use should be found to be within the United
States as well, regardless of where each step takes place.304 Under
that scenario, the terms of the transaction indicate that the method is
being used within the United States as well, even if a step takes place
outside the geographic boundaries.
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly emphasized the importance of
the terms of the agreement over the actual location of the
infringement—stating that to do otherwise would be to elevate form
over substance.305 In 2004, GlowProducts, a Canadian company, sold
and shipped products, including artificial, lighted “ice cubes,” from a
Canadian website to customers located in the United States.306
302. See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1381–82 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); M2M Sols., LLC, 2016 WL 70814, at *18–19.
303. The Federal Circuit has expressed great skepticism as to whether it is
possible to sell a method or not. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d
1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005). If it is not possible to sell a method, then it is certainly not
possible to sell one across geographic boundaries.
304. Id. at 1317.
305. Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
306. Id. at 1357–58.
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Vanderschuit owns a patent on an artificial, lighted “ice cube” and
sued GlowProducts for patent infringement.307 GlowProducts sold the
infringing “ice cubes” from their British Columbia facility,308 but the
language of the transactions clearly stated that the destination for the
purchased products was the United States and included shipping
charges for the destinations specified by the purchases.309 The sales
were, therefore, found to be United States sales.310 The terms of the
deal dictated the location of the infringing sale.
In 2005, two American companies signed a contract in Norway for
the sale of an offshore drilling rig.311 The contract, signed outside the
United States geographic boundaries, explicitly stated that the oil rig
was for use in the Gulf of Mexico.312 Before the rig was delivered, a
suit for patent infringement was brought based solely on the contract
executed and signed in Norway. 313 At the time the parties entered
into the contract, the vessel was under construction in Singapore, and
during the time between the sale of the vessel and the delivery of the
offshore drilling rig to the Gulf of Mexico, the seller modified the
vessel so that it no longer used the patented technology, the sale was
found to be governed by United States patent law.314
307. Id. at 1357.
308. Id. at 1358.
309. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 6, Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc.,
523 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2006-1646).
310. Id.; Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1371.
311. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.’s Response Brief in Opposition to Transocean’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Infringement at 12, Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., No. H-07-2392, 2009 WL
8712584, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 28, 2009) (No. H-07-02392), 2009 WL 1612927.
312. Id. The parties disagreed, however, whether the rig could be used outside of
the Gulf. Id. Transocean asserted the contract limited permissible use to the Gulf of
Mexico; Maersk, on the other hand, asserted the Drilling contract permitted use “in
places other than the Gulf of Mexico.” Id.
313. Transocean sued Maersk for patent infringement in July 2007. Id. at 9. The
rig at issue, however, was not delivered to Maersk until January 2009. Id. at 13.
Furthermore, the oilrig was modified before it was delivered to the Gulf of Mexico, and
Transocean continued to assert that its infringement claim was based on the “rig that
was the subject of the sale or offer for sale between Maersk and Statoil” the version of
the oilrig before it was modified. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 55, Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2009-1556), 2009 WL 5070048.
314. To make this even more interesting, the patents on the technology in question
have been declared invalid in Norway and severely curtailed by the European Union,
so limited suits could have been brought in the country where the transaction actually
took place. Amicus Curiae Brief of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark in Support
of Petitioner at 3, Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014) (No. 13-43), 2013 WL 4049457.
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Emphasizing again that the language of the transaction controls
the location of the infringement when two companies entered into a
contract within the United States for the sale of a patented invention
manufactured and delivered overseas, the sale was found to be outside
the scope of the domestic patent laws.315 The District of Delaware
focused on the language included in the contract, stating that the
accused products, manufactured abroad, would be shipped to a
contract manufacturer, also abroad, to determine that the terms of
the transaction controlled the location of the sale, which was found to
be outside both the United States geographic boundaries and the
United States patent boundaries.316 A similar outcome arose from a
contract between two U.S. companies entered into in the United
States for the sale “of a patented invention with delivery and
performance outside of the United States.”317
Infringement differentiates neither between the types of
infringing uses nor the nature of the goods themselves.318 If an
unauthorized party makes, uses, sells, offers to sell or imports the
innovation, then that party infringes the patent.319 When the Federal
Circuit looked to the language of the transaction to expand the
definition of “within the United States” for purposes of selling or
offering to sell, the definition similarly expanded for use.320 If the
terms of the transaction state that the benefit of the invention
remains within the United States, then the invention is more likely to
be within the United States patent boundaries, even if a step or
element occurs outside the United States geographic boundaries. The
terms are not controlling but can help determine the location of the
potential infringement.
4. The Nature of the Intellectual Property and the Character of Its
Commercial Embodiment
The nature of the intellectual property and the character of its
commercial embodiment need to be considered in determining
whether an unauthorized domestic use has occurred or not. Software
315. See M2M Sols. LLC v. Motorola Sols., Inc., No. 12-33-RGA, 2016 WL 70814,
at *18 (D. Del. Jan. 6, 2016).
316. Id. at *20.
317. Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Techs., L.L.C. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 964
F. Supp. 2d 653, 657 (E.D. Tex. 2013).
318. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2018).
319. Id.
320. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308–10 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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provides an example of the inherent nature of the intellectual
property and the character of its commercial embodiment. Software
itself is intangible. However, when software is saved to a physical
object, such as a disk, USB drive, or external hard drive, then there is
a tangible object. The commercial embodiment of each of these types
of intellectual property is very different, and that character needs to
be taken into account in determining whether an act that takes place
across geographic boundaries falls under the United States patent
system or not.
The character of the commercial embodiment and the nature of
the intellectual property should not allow infringers to avoid errors in
claim drafting. If the claims are drafted so that the act can never take
place within the United States, then that is an uninfringeable claim—
regardless of the nature of the invention.321 If the claimed commercial
embodiment is a telephone system that requires two different local
networks in two different countries, then the control and benefit are
in neither country, and no domestic use of the invention has occurred.
If the claimed commercial embodiment, on the other hand, is a
telephone system that uses a domestic network to send a signal to an
extraterritorial network and then uses the domestic network to
receive the signal domestically, that is an embodiment that could be
used domestically. Poor claim drafting cannot be overcome by a claim
for control and benefit from within the United States. The claimed
invention is what is protected.
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
heard arguments in NTP v. RIM, better known as the BlackBerry
case.322 The main issue in the litigation focused on whether an
invention was within the United States “if a component or step of the
patented invention is located or performed abroad.”323 The invention
in question was a system and a method for the wireless exchange of
email.324 The unlicensed competing system and method both relied on
a Canadian server.325 The remainder of the system was located within
the United States, and all other steps of the method of delivering the
email were located within the United States.326

321. See, e.g., Tech. Patents, LLC v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 573 F. Supp. 2d 903
(D. Md. 2008), aff’d, Tech. Patents, LLC v. T-Mobile (UK) Ltd., 700 F.3d 482 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
322. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
323. Id. at 1315.
324. Id. at 1287.
325. Id. at 1290.
326. Id. at 1314–15.
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The Federal Circuit held that “[t]he use of a claimed system . . . is
the place at which the system as a whole is put into service, i.e., the
place where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the
system obtained.”327 In other words, the location of one component in
Canada did not remove the system from being used within the United
States. If the system is controlled from and the benefit of the system
is within the United States, then according to the Federal Circuit, the
system is within the United States.328 In differentiating between the
tangible and intangible, the Federal Circuit reached a different
conclusion with regard to the method of using the system, holding that
“the concept of ‘use’ of a patented method or process is fundamentally
different from the use of a patented system or device.”329 The Federal
Circuit held that a “process cannot be used ‘within’ the United
States . . . unless each of the steps is performed within this country.”330
This is a distinction without meaning.
An innovative system invention falls within United States patent
boundaries if it is controlled from within the United States, even if
every component is not within the United States.331 Under this
holding, if a method is at issue, it cannot be within United States
patent boundaries unless every step of the method occurs within the
United States. In differentiating between method and system claims,
the Federal Circuit flew in the face of the plain language of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a), which states that the unauthorized use of an invention
within the United States is patent infringement.332 Under 35 U.S.C. §
101,
patentable
inventions
include
processes,
machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matter.333 Users of systems and
methods who are located in the United States, who control and derive
benefit from those systems and methods, even if a component or step
is located overseas, use those devices in the United States. The
distinction made between methods and systems by the courts is one
example of the non-textually driven wedge between patenting the
intangible and tangible.334

327. Id. at 1317.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1318.
331. See id.
332. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
333. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
334. Professor Holbrook’s article, Method Patent Exceptionalism, argues that
neither 101 nor 271 differentiate between methods and other types of inventions, nor
should such a differentiation be made. See generally Holbrook, supra note 15.
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A potential domestic infringer who accesses a website in Ireland
is using that website in the United States. A potential domestic
infringer who mails a USB drive to Ireland containing a piece of
software that the Irish user then makes a copy of, installs the copy in
Ireland, runs the program, and mails back a USB drive containing the
results is not using the Irish component of the software in the United
States.335 It is not an unauthorized domestic use if the potential
infringer controls the USB drive and benefits from the use of the
software in Ireland.336 Current network technology makes using the
Irish website in the United States seamless. The user does not need
to know, nor does the user usually care, exactly where the software is
located, as long as the user retains the benefit of using the software.
In the United Kingdom, the courts expressly recognized this—finding
that “a server in Antigua was ‘used’ in the U.K. when bets were placed
over a computer network from a U.K. client, even though the
processing at the heart of the patented gaming system actually
occurred in Antigua.”337 Physically mailing the USB device is not
seamless, and the installation of the software in Ireland is not
controlled from within the United States. The character of the
commercial embodiment is fundamentally different in each of these
scenarios.
Sending email, using software across a network, controlling a
method from within the United States, and retaining the domestic
benefit all are examples of intellectual property embodied in a fashion
that defies geographic boundaries. As such, the question should not
be where each step of the method or each component of the system is
located—but rather, the focus should turn on where the control and
benefit are retained. Commercial embodiments of intellectual
property that require the user to cross geographic boundaries to
perform the process physically are less likely to be used or controlled
from within the United States.
5. The Pricing Structure and Accrual of Financial Benefit
Under trademark law, one of the main factors that comes into play
in determining whether domestic laws cover an international act of

335. See generally Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (discussing whether exported software code is a component of a patent
invention).
336. See generally id.
337. Mark A. Lemley et. al, Divided Infringement Claims, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 117,
128 (2005).
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trademark infringement is the impact of the alleged infringer’s
conduct on domestic commerce.338 This factor relies heavily on where
the infringer accrued financial benefit from the alleged
infringement.339 If the infringer accrues financial benefit
domestically, then even the international act may be covered by the
domestic trademark laws. If an unauthorized user accrues domestic
financial benefit because of a process that occurs across geographic
boundaries, that domestic financial benefit should be taken into
consideration in determining whether a domestic use of the invention
has occurred.
There are limits to the importance of this factor, however. Under
copyright law, an international infringement that results in business
transactions taking place within the United States is not enough to
render the copyright domestically infringed.340 Despite the domestic
exchange of money, if all potential unauthorized use occurs
extraterritorially, then the infringement itself is not domestic.341 A
domestic financial benefit is not enough to find a domestic
infringement.342 The accrual of financial benefit is one aspect of the
transaction to be considered, but it is not enough, in and of itself, to
render the use to be one within the United States patent
boundaries.343 Otherwise, domestic companies with an international
presence could find themselves liable for domestic patent
infringement based on international transactions, simply because the
corporate headquarters are located in Delaware.
On the other hand, changing the pricing structure so that all
financial benefit accrues outside the United States is not enough to
lead to a determination that the asserted unauthorized use did not
occur within the United States, either. The benefits of unauthorized
use are not merely monetary. Unauthorized use can impact the
income to the patentee through a diversion of sales, loss of licensing
opportunities, a decrease in the market value of the license
arrangement, depression in value of the product, or other nonmonetary detriments.344

338. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642–43 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
339. See id. at 644.
340. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2015).
341. See id.
342. Quantitative Fin. Software, Ltd. v. Infinity Fin. Tech., Inc., No. 97 CIV. 7879
(LMM), 1998 WL 427710, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1998).
343. See id.
344. Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Divided Infringement: Expanding the
Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 303 (2007).
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6. Commercial Relationship Between the Sites of Use and Control
There are many times when the sites of the use, control, and
extraterritorial steps are all connected commercially. To determine
the situs for an infringing use of networked technology, of technology
used outside of traditional geographic boundaries, and of technology
that benefits from its extraterritorial nature, the commercial
relationship between sites of use and control must be considered.
When seeking a patent on operating a naval base “located offshore,
preferabl[y] in international waters”,345 a patent on a pneumatic
conveyance system for offshore oil drilling rigs,346 or a patent on a
“refrigeration apparatus for cooling containers and food in the
microgravity conditions of outer space,”347 it is clear that the benefit
is accruing somewhere besides the location of the actual invention. In
these scenarios, the commercial relationship between the sites of use
and benefit may help determine where the invention is being used for
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 271.
In 2003, Constellation Services, Inc., a commercial space services
company, received a patent titled: “Method and apparatus for
supplying orbital space platforms using payload canisters via
intermediate orbital rendezvous and docking.”348 One anticipated use
of this patented method is to deliver goods to the International Space
Station.349 To practice the patent, a party would launch a supply
canister into orbit using a launch vehicle, dock the canister to an
intermediate space vehicle, and transfer the canister to the
International Space Station.350 If the method delivers goods to the
United States module, then current law says that this method is
delivering goods to the United States. If the method delivers goods to
the Russian, Canadian, Japanese, or European module or
laboratory,351 then the only tangible connection to the United States

345. U.S. Patent No. 5,189,978, col. 2, l. 54–56 (issued March 2, 1993).
346. M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Ltd., 890 F.3d 995, 998 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
347. U.S. Patent No. 4,738,113 (issued Apr. 19, 1988).
348. U.S. Patent No. 6,669,148 (issued Dec. 30, 2003).
349. Id. at col. 1.
350. Id. at col. 4, l. 17–31.
351. “The station is a venture of international cooperation among NASA, the
Russian Federal Space Agency, Canadian Space Agency, Japan Aerospace Exploration
Agency, or JAXA, and 11 members of the European Space Agency, or ESA: Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.” NASA, Nations Around the World Mark 10th
Anniversary of International Space Station, NASA: INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
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could potentially be the launch from the United States.352 There is no
way for every step of this method to occur within the United States.353
The use of the “intermediate space vehicle to position the supply
canister relative to the space platform” must occur in outer space,
which is not subject to United States patent law.354 Congress has
extended United States patent law “to applicable activities conducted
in outer space.”355 Inventions in outer space are expressly “within the
United States” if the invention is “made, used or sold in outer space
on a space object or component thereof under the jurisdiction or
control of the United States” unless the “space object . . . is specifically
identified and otherwise provided for by an international agreement”
or the space object is registered to a foreign state.356 However, this
does not take into account the positioning of the supply canister,
which is taking place in outer space.
Microsoft produces, distributes, and hosts software worldwide.357
Its data centers, services, and facilities are located around the
globe.358 Machalek invented software that extracted relevant data
from a customer relationship management database and imported it
into spreadsheets.359 Machalek sued Microsoft for its unauthorized
use of Machalek’s software.360 If Microsoft controlled the use of its
software from within the United States and benefited from that use,
even if the software was stored on a non-domestic server, Microsoft
was engaging in unauthorized domestic use of Machalek’s
invention.361 Microsoft’s ownership and the ongoing commercial

(Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/main/10th_anniversary.
html/.
352. There are less than two dozen launch sites worldwide that operate on a
regular basis, and of these, four are in the United States. Space Launch Sites Around
the World, SPACE TODAY ONLINE, http://www.spacetoday.org/Rockets/Spaceports/
LaunchSites.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
353. U.S. Patent No. 6,669,148, col. 4, l. 17–31 (issued Dec. 30, 2003).
354. Id. at col. 10, l. 1–2.
355. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, INVENTIONS IN OUTER SPACE, S. REP. NO. 101-266, at 6
(1990).
356. 35 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018).
357. See generally Facts About Microsoft, MICROSOFT (Feb. 11, 2020, 1:48 PM),
https://news.microsoft.com/facts-about-microsoft/.
358. Id.
359. MasterMine Software, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 13-cv-971, 2015 WL
12778417, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2015).
360. Id.
361. See id. at *11 (“[W]here users located in the United States control and derive
beneficial use from a device located overseas that infringes a claimed system, those
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relationship between the location of the software and the location of
the user provides a basis for finding the method is controlled from
within the United States. If Microsoft benefits from this use, then the
method is being domestically used without authorization.
The reverse is also true. Microsoft licenses software such as
Microsoft Office to individuals.362 In order to use that software, the
individual must activate the software with Microsoft’s Product
Activation technology.363 Foreign software licensees may activate the
software through the Microsoft Clearinghouse located in the United
States.364 Microsoft controls this system from within the United
States, and the system extends a domestic benefit to Microsoft and
the user. The method of activation is being used within the United
States, even when the activating party is outside the United States.365
The focus must remain on the location from where the technology
is controlled and the location where the benefit is derived. If a
Pakistani company creates an electronic catalog in Pakistan by
crawling the web to visit websites located in the United States, that
company is not creating the catalog within the United States. The
visit to a domestic website by a Pakistani computer or computer
operator seeking information to be used and stored in Pakistan
remains a Pakistani use of the website.366 The visit is controlled from
Pakistan, and the benefit is accrued in Pakistan.
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (Transocean), an
Anglo-Australian company, holds several United States patents for
methods and apparatus for offshore drilling.367 As the name suggests,
much of offshore drilling takes place outside the geographic
boundaries of the United States, and the value and benefit of this
technology require protection beyond the strict geographic boundaries
of the United States. Transocean learned that its patented technology
was being used, without permission, in the Gulf of Mexico—in an area

users use the infringing device in the United States and commit direct infringement.”
(quoting Renhcol Inc. v. Don Best Sports, 548 F. Supp. 2d 356, 360 (E.D. Tex. 2008))).
362. See
MICROSOFT
LICENSING,
https://www.microsoft.com/enus/licensing/default (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
363. See Product Activation and Key Information, MICROSOFT LICENSING,
https://licensingapps.microsoft.com/product-activation (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
364. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156 (2009).
365. Id.
366. CNET Networks, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 985, 991 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
367. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No.
H-03-2910, 2006 WL 3813778, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
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located within the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).368
The courts found this use within the United States, and Transocean
was able to pursue its claim of infringing use by the unauthorized
parties.369 WesternGeco owns several patents on a device for and a
method of gathering information about the ocean floor.370 The device
and method were used, without authorization, in the Chukchi Sea,
also located in the United States EEZ; however, this use was not found
to be within the United States.371 There is no easy way to differentiate
between the location of the infringement in these two cases. The focus
of the issue ought not to be whether the use has occurred in the EEZ
or not, but rather what is the relationship between the commercial
site of the use, the EEZ, and the commercial site receiving the benefit
of the use, and from where that use is controlled. In the case of aquatic
exploration and offshore mining, it is often easier to determine the
location of the benefit than the location of the use itself.
There are many examples of patents that have domestic value in
their extraterritorial use. Allowing unauthorized users to benefit from
the extraterritorial aspects, while sheltering the same users from §
271, undermines the very values of our patent system. When there is
a commercial relationship between the sites of use and control, the
use should be found to be domestic. When the value of the invention
is its extraterritorial application, to hold otherwise would be to
remove all potential protections from such inventions, and to
discourage innovation in the ever-expanding technological reaches of
our physical world.

368. The United States EEZ was established by Presidential Proclamation in 1983
and includes all waters adjacent to the United States territorial seas extending 200
nautical miles from the territorial seas. The EEZ is “an area beyond the territory and
territorial sea of the United States in which all States enjoy the high seas freedoms of
navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea.” Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605
(Mar. 10, 1983).
369. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 2006 WL 3813778, at *1.
370. WesternGeco, LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
371. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 869 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796 (S.D.
Tex. 2012), rev’d in part on other grounds, No. 4:09-CV-1827, 2012 WL 1708852 (S.D.
Tex. May 15, 2012) (“[T]his Court has held that the high seas, including the Chukchi
Sea, and the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone (‘EEZ’), including the EEZ in the
Gulf of Mexico, are not U.S. territories or possessions for purposes of the Patent Act.”).
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7. Intent
Proof of an incentive to practice a patent without authorization
must be more than proof of knowledge—known or should have
known—of the United States patents. There must be a nexus between
knowledge of the United States patents and an intention to
circumvent the territorial limitations of United States patent law.
United States patent laws should not be construed to penalize
domestic companies or companies that contribute significantly to the
domestic economy as compared to foreign competitors. However, any
company that seeks to circumvent United States patent boundaries
by playing games should be subject to United States patent laws if the
unauthorized use is controlled within the United States, the financial
benefit accrues within the United States, and there is an incentive to
avoid becoming an authorized user of the patented technology.
“Power Integrations and Fairchild are direct competitors in the
power supply controller chip market.”372 Power Integration owns
several patents on power supply controller chips,373 which ensure that
the power supply functions properly.374 Power Integration sued
Fairchild for patent infringement.375 In the suit, Power Integration
argued that Fairchild made international chip sales to induce
domestic infringement.376 The Federal Circuit found that, although no
single piece of evidence was individually sufficient to show intent, the
evidence as a whole provided a basis for a potential finding of induced
infringement.377 In other words, knowledge of the patent and intent
to profit were not enough; there also had to be an intention on
Fairchild’s part to profit off of the unauthorized domestic use of the
international product sales. In finding such a basis, the Federal
Circuit looked at Fairchild’s actions concerning its chips.
Fairchild promoted its chips as complying with regulations
specific to the United States, including the California Energy

372. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 843 F.3d 1315,
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
373. Fairchild is also the holder of several patents in this space, but this
discussion focuses on Fairchild’s unauthorized use of Power Integrations’ patented
technology. See List of Patentees, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2017/week45/OG/patentee/alphaS.html
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
374. Power Integrations Inc., 843 F.3d at 1321.
375. See id. at 1324.
376. See id. at 1324–25.
377. See id. at 1334.
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Commission and Energy Star Level 5 standards. 378 These standards
are specific to the United States, and in fact, are less stringent than
the European Union’s standards.379 In addition, Fairchild states that
it stands behind its products and indemnifies its customers against
suits for infringement of United States patents.380 Fairchild further
targeted customers in the United States through its advertising and
its website. 381 As a whole, the Federal Circuit found this could be
enough evidence to show an intent to induce domestic infringement.382
An indemnification agreement should not be enough to establish
that control and benefit lie within the United States. Absent evidence
that the primary purpose of the indemnification agreement was to
result in unauthorized use of the invention within the United States,
it is reasonable to assume that the primary purpose of the
indemnification agreement exists for some purpose other than to
maintain control and reap domestic benefit. However, an
indemnification agreement may be indicative of an overall intent.
Insufficient in and of itself—it may be significant in light of other
activities on the part of the unauthorized user.
Nor should designing a product to comply with United States
regulations be enough to establish either that Fairchild controls the
use of its products within the United States or that Fairchild benefits
from the use of those products. However, again, this may be indicative
of other actions on the part of Fairchild that may lead to a finding of
control and benefit within the United States. The relationship
between the parties using Fairchild’s chips and Fairchild must be
examined in light of all of these questions before a determination can
be made. If Fairchild conditions its profits, even downstream, on the
sale of goods within the United States, then Fairchild is benefitting
financially from the domestic use. The indemnification clause may be

378. Power Integrations’ Non-Confidential Opening Brief at 50–51, Power
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 843 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(No. 15-1329), 2015 WL 6061894.
379. Power Integrations Inc., 843 F.3d at 1334 (“The jury also heard testimony
that, while other countries initially adopted the United States energy efficiency
standards, certain countries had established different, more stringent standards of
their own.”).
380. Litigation Update, FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCTOR, https://www.fairchildsemi.
com/about/media/litigation-update/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (“We stand behind our
products. Our worldwide terms and conditions of sale include industry-standard
indemnification for patent infringement. For products subject to injunctions, we have
been forced to limit this indemnification.”).
381. Power Integrations’ Non-Confidential Opening Brief, supra note 378, at 37;
Litigation Update, supra note 380.
382. Power Integrations, 843 F.3d at 1334.
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further proof of a relationship between Fairchild and the end-user
that results in Fairchild’s control over the unauthorized domestic use
of the power supply controller chip. Compliance with regulations
should be examined in the light of the relationship between the
parties—not seeking to penalize international companies seeking to
maximize the market for a product, but rather seeking to
disincentivize companies seeking to circumvent patent boundaries
while profiting off of unauthorized domestic use. Evidence of active
steps taken to control domestic use supports a finding that a party
intends the domestic use and is seeking to circumnavigate the United
States patent boundaries. Such use must be found to be within the
United States.
Intent separates those who are genuinely seeking to
circumnavigate the United States patent system and yet still practice
domestically from those who are practicing part of the patented
technology domestically with a focus on the overseas application of the
method. Intent distinguishes the patent boundaries.
8. Economic Realities
Even after analyzing all of the issues described above, whether an
invention falls within the boundaries of the United States will turn on
the economic realities of the invention and its use. Delineating the
economic realities is a tricky proposition and a strict categorization of
an invention can lead to strained results and could lead to technology
covered by no countries’ laws.
It cannot make sense to allow computer servers to go the way of
commercial ships—flagged and established in countries with minimal
legal protections for the parties. Companies may choose to register
vessels in countries other than the country where the company is
based, or even where the ship is docked.383 That registration allows
the ship to fly a nation’s flag with which nation the ship has only a
383. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of
Convenience: Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 162 (1997)
(“One of the premises of the principle of freedom of the high seas is that all states have
the right to grant nationality to a vessel in accordance with national and international
law . . . [T]he flag state, the state granting nationality to a vessel, has exclusive
jurisdiction over that vessel on the high seas to the extent permitted by international
law.”); see also Tom Hamburger & Kim Geiger, Foreign Flagging of Offshore Rigs
Skirts U.S. Safety Rules, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2010), http://articles.
latimes.com/2010/jun/14/nation/la-na-oil-inspection-20100615
(Companies
can
register vessels “in unlikely places such as the Marshall Islands, Panama and
Liberia—reducing the U.S. government’s role in inspecting and enforcing safety and
other standards.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456255

544

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87.483

tenuous nexus. International maritime law generally holds that the
law of the country whose flag the ship flies governs a ship.384 These
“flags of convenience” may shelter a vessel from the laws of the
country where the vessel is located.385 Ships that sail under a nation’s
flag “shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”386
The result of extending this notion to computer servers, used in so
many method patents, may lead to a poor fit between the patent laws
of a country and the server technology. The Marshall Islands, for
instance, is a popular country in which to register ships and oil rigs.387
There is no patent law in the Marshall Islands. In fact, “[t]he only
intellectual property-related legislation relates to locally produced
music recordings.”388 The Marshall Islands may, therefore, provide a
patent shelter for servers.389 If the placement of a server in the
Marshall Islands removes all liability for unauthorized use of methods
that access the Marshall Island servers, then the patent system is
broken. The domestic user does not know and, in fact, has no ability
to gain knowledge, of the server location, yet the domestic user is
benefitting from the access the internet gives to the international
servers. Such a use weakens domestic patent protection.
The “law of the flag” is a poor fit for the technological advances
made possible by the internet and cloud computing. The economic
realities of the internet dictate the idea that a user should only be
liable in one location.390 Otherwise, a user of a patented method
sitting in Oklahoma could find themselves subject to being charged
with unauthorized use of a patent in jurisdictions all over the world.
The economic realities of network technologies dictate that a party
should be held accountable for unauthorized use of the technology in

384. United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 405–06 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The traditional
statement of the doctrine provides that a merchant ship is part of the territory of the
country whose flag she flies, and that actions aboard that ship are subject to the laws
of the flag state.”).
385. See Anderson, supra note 383, at 162; Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 119, 126 (2005) (“Despite the fact that the cruises are operated by a company
based in the United States, serve predominantly United States residents, and are in
most other respects United States-centered ventures, almost all of [Norwegian Cruise
Line’s] cruise ships are registered in other countries, flying so-called flags of
convenience.”).
386. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 92, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397. UNCLOS art. 92.
387. See Hamburger & Geiger, supra note 383.
388. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT - MARSHALL
ISLANDS (June 2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191946.htm.
389. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (issued Apr. 28, 2009).
390. See Lemley et al., supra note 337, at 120–23.
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the location where the technology is controlled from, and the benefit
is received.391 If the practice of a single step of a method could lead to
liability, then our unwitting domestic user could find themselves
facing international prosecution. On the other hand, requiring every
step to be practiced domestically would allow our strategic domestic
user to circumvent United States patent boundaries by choosing to
use an international server for the unauthorized practice of a
domestically patented technology. Neither of these scenarios leads to
a desirable outcome for either our domestic user or the patentee.
Medical diagnostic patents are a growing area of intangible
innovation. Many medical diagnostic tests involve taking a sample of
blood from a patient, analyzing the blood, thinking about the result,
and changing the patient’s prescription based on the result.392 Neither
doctor nor patient is concerned about where the blood is tested—only
where the patient is. A party who wishes to avoid any potential patent
infringement could circumvent the domestic patent system by sending
the blood, or the electronic data representing the results of the blood
draw, overseas, and then import the relevant data. It should make no
difference whether the physical blood or the electronic picture of the
blood is sent overseas. Nor should it make a difference that the
diagnostic step may occur outside the United States. The test is
controlled from within the United States, the benefit is derived from
within the United States, and the use should also be found to be
within the United States. Taking a pragmatic approach to the
question of economic realities of the use of the patented invention can
help the parties determine where the use has occurred.
IV. EXCLUDING THE INTANGIBLE
Regulating and protecting American industry and trade has long
been a critical factor in the United States economy. Domestic industry
is protected through a variety of methods, including seizures of
harmful items at the border and the use of tariffs and subsidies.393

391. See id.
392. See, e.g., Method of Treating IBD/Crohn’s Disease and Related Conditions
Wherein Drug Metabolite Levels in Blood Cells Determine Subsequent Dosage, U.S.
Patent No. 6,355,623 (issued Mar.12, 2002).
393. For example, the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) has the ability to seize
the individual electronic devices of anyone seeking to enter the United States and
search any information that CBP would like to search. CBP can also keep the
electronic device for an unspecified amount of time because of the potential harm of
the intangible property accessed through the electronic device. The harms of that
intangible property on domestic industry can be quite extensive, yet, CBP is not
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Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 gives the United States
International Trade Commission (ITC) the power to protect United
States domestic industry from unfair methods of competition and
unfair acts regarding the importation and sale of articles in the
United States.394 However, § 337 sets forth no definition of article nor
sets up a certain standard for what is a violation.395 Violations were
left to the ITC to determine.396
Central to the mission of the ITC is its mandate to protect
domestic industry and promote trade through its power to exclude
imports that violate domestic intellectual property rights or injure a
domestic industry.397 Section 337 actions give the ITC the power to
investigate complaints brought by owners of United States
intellectual property who allege that they are subjected to unfair
competition due to the importation of infringing products into the
United States.398 The complainant is neither asserting its intellectual
property against another company nor is the complainant initiating a
lawsuit. The ITC is entrusted with the task of determining whether
an ITC complainant has established: (1) unfair competition or an
unfair act; (2) importation, sale for importation, or sale after
importation into the United States of the accused products; and (3)
the existence of a domestic industry relating to the product in
question. In investigations that are not based upon the alleged
infringement of enumerated federal statutory intellectual property
rights, a complainant also must prove (4) that the alleged unfair act
has caused or threatens to cause injury.399 The ITC’s mission is to
protect domestic industry, not to protect the complainant’s
intellectual property rights.400 To draw distinctions between the
tangible elements and the intangible elements in an allegation of
intellectual property infringement is to misunderstand the mission of
the ITC.

reviewing personal data for its impact on domestic industry, and instead they are
looking for signs of criminal behavior.
394. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018).
395. 2 F.R.D. 239, 254 (1976).
396. Id.
397. About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2020).
398. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018).
399. Id.
400. About the USITC, supra note 397.
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A. Articulating A Definition of Article
“Congress has deemed it illegal to import articles that infringe
patents and impact domestic industry. The role of the ITC is to protect
trade and domestic industry. When domestic industry is harmed by
patent infringement, and a complaint is filed at the ITC,” then there
should be no difference in the type of article being imported—tangible
or intangible. 401
On being asked to exclude intangible articles, the Commission has
repeatedly found jurisdiction.402 The Supreme Court has held that
such an interpretation should be accorded deference if it meets the
two-part test set forth in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.403 Under this test, the first question asked is “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”404 If
Congress has not spoken then “the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”405
Accordingly, the ITC’s definition must be viewed through the
Chevron lens. If congressional intent is clear, then the agency “must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”406
However, if the statute is silent or leaves a gap for the agency to fill,
the court must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is
proper.407 When the Tariff Act of 1930 was enacted, the Information
Age had not yet begun. The term “article” is broad in scope and is not
restricted to items creatable and contemplatable at the time of the
enactment of the Tariff Act of 1930.408 There is no reason now to
restrict article to goods of a tangible nature. Statutory silence is not
the same thing as a lack of coverage.409
Congress has not directly answered whether intangible goods
qualify as articles under § 337, giving the ITC discretion in reaching

401. Elizabeth I. Winston, Standard Essential Patents at the United States
International Trade Commission, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 449 (Jorge L.
Conteras ed., 2017).
402. See, e.g., 833 Investigation, supra note 9.
403. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 843.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. See, e.g., Schick X-Ray Co., Inc. v. United States, 59 Cust. Ct. 108, 112 (Cust.
Ct. 1967) (hydraulic hospital table for use with X-ray equipment was an article).
409. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315–16 (1980).
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a definition,410 but such discretion must be exercised in a manner
consistent with the congressional policy underlying the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended in the Trade Act of 1974.411 The second question
raised by Chevron is whether interpreting the term “article” to include
both the intangible and the tangible is a permissible construction of
the statute.412 To effectuate congressional intent, the term should be
given its broadest possible meaning.
When a statute uses a term throughout, that use carries a
presumption that Congress “intended that the term have the same
meaning in each of the pertinent sections or subsections of the
statute.”413 Therefore, to define the term “article,” the ITC should
undertake a reasoned analysis as to how other agencies have
interpreted the term as used in the Trade Act of 1974, and ensure that
any definition implemented by the ITC is consistent with the
definition implemented by other agencies.414 Under the Chevron test,
the ITC has a great deal of freedom in determining what the definition
of article is—and finding that an article includes the intangible is a
“permissible construction of the statute.” 415
In 1998, the ITC found that the legislative history of § 337
supported the conclusion that intangible items are articles covered by
§ 337.416 The ITC stated that:
[I]n passing the 1988 amendments to section 337,
Congress stated that the predecessor version of section
337 “was designed to cover a broad range of unfair
acts” and that the purpose of the 1988 amendments
was “to strengthen the effectiveness of section 337 in
410. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2018) (“Each determination under subsection (d) or
(e) shall be made on the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity
with the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5.”); Sapna Kumar, Regulating
Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1909, 1938 (2015) (“The ITC interpreted ‘articles’
through formal adjudication, in accordance with §§ 556 and 557 of the Administrative
Procedure Act.”).
411. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (quoting
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968)).
412. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
413. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
414. Former Emps. of Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 29 Ct. Int’l
Trade 1334, 1343 (citing Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1278, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The
same term cannot have different meanings in related statutes.”).
415. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
416. In the Matter of Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Sys. and Components
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-383, USITC Pub. 1998-3154 (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter 383
Investigation].
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addressing the growing problems being faced by U.S.
companies from the importation of articles which
infringe U.S. intellectual property rights.”417
The ITC focused on the ITC’s responsibility to “effectively
remedy[] violations of section 337.”418 Such a “remedy would be
rendered significantly less effective if it did not extend to electronic
transmissions of software.” 419
Congress did not codify a definition of the term “article.” Looking
contextually at the term “article” in the Trade Act of 1974, the
definition remains unclear. The use of the term article may have been
chosen for the very reason that it is unclear, allowing for an
uncommon breadth in interpretation. The term article should be
interpreted consistently within the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in
the Trade Act of 1974. Under the Tariff Act, the Department of Labor
(Labor), the ITC, and the CBP are each authorized to regulate
international trade.420 In fulfilling its regulatory role, each agency
has relied on a definition of the term. Labor and CBP have both
interpreted “article” to cover the tangible and intangible421—
rendering such an interpretation a reasonable interpretation of
section 337.
1. Customs and Border Patrol
Customs has held that “the transmission of software modules and
products to the United States from a foreign country via the Internet
is an importation of merchandise into the customs territory of the
United States in that the software modules and products are brought
in to the United States from a foreign country.”422 According to
Customs, therefore, software is merchandise and a good, even if not
covered by the HTSUS.423 Articles, such as merchandise and goods,
are both tangible and intangible. Telecommunications, however, have
been expressly exempted from tariff duties, potential evidence of
Congressional intent to avoid regulating the entry of digital

417. Id. at 28-29. (quoting S. Rep. 100-71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 128).
418. 383 Investigation, supra note 416, at 29.
419. Id.
420. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018).
421. See Kumar, supra note 410, at 1912, 1930.
422. Customs Ruling HQ 114459 (Sept. 17, 1998), http://www.faqs.org/rulings/
rulings1998HQ114459.html.
423. Id.
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information through electronic transmission.424 Regulation of the
entry of digital information is still monitored by CBP, who can seize
the individual electronic devices of anyone seeking to enter the United
States and search for information stored therein.425 CBP can also keep
the electronic device for an unspecified amount of time because of the
potential harm of the intangible property stored on the electronic
device.426 The harms of that intangible property on domestic industry
can be quite extensive, yet CBP is not reviewing personal data for its
impact on domestic industry, and instead, they are looking for signs
of criminal behavior.427 CBP has a demonstrable interest in intangible
data entering the United States.428
2. Department of Labor429
The definition of the term “article” as used in the Trade Act of 1974
has been extensively discussed outside the context of the ITC and in
the context of the Department of Labor (Labor). The Trade Act of 1974
has been amended over the years to allow Labor to provide trade
adjustment assistance benefits to workers who have lost their jobs.430
In order to qualify for assistance under the Trade Adjustment

424. See Former Emps. of Gale Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 403 F. Supp. 2d
1299, 1302 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005) (“The HTSUS does not consider telecommunications
transmissions as goods and are thus exempted from duty.”) (citing HTSUS, General
Note 3(e) (2004))); Customs Ruling HQ 114459, supra note 422 (citing Customs Ruling
HQ 960179 (Apr. 17, 1997), http://www.faqs.org/rulings/rulings1997HQ960179.html).
425. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CPB DIRECTIVE 3340-049A, BORDER
SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES § 1 (2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/
default/files/assets/documents/2018-Jan/CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-ofElectronic-Media-Compliant.pdf.
426. Id. at § 5.4.1.
427. Id. at § 1.
428. Id.
429. This Section examines the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers and
Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance programs (collectively referred to herein as
TAA) administered by the U.S. Department of Labor, which was most recently
extended and amended in October 2011. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271–2331 (2012) (amended
by To Extend the Generalized System of Preferences, and For Other Purposes, Pub. L.
No. 112-40, 125 Stat. 401 (2011) (containing Title II, Trade Adjustment Assistance
Extension Act of 2011)).
430. “The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Program is a federal program that
provides a path for employment growth and opportunity through aid to US workers
who have lost their jobs as a result of international trade.” N.Y. EMP’T SERVS. SYS.,
TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE – ELIGIBILITY AND INTAKE OSOS GUIDE 1 (2019),
https://www.labor.ny.gov/workforcenypartners/osos/TAA-OSOS-Guide-1-IntakeEligibility.pdf [hereinafter OSOS GUIDE].
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Assistance program (TAA), there are several requirements, including
the specific requirement that the workers must have lost their jobs
because of the shift of production overseas of articles or as the result
of increased imports of articles.431
Neither the Trade Act nor the TAA contains a definition of the
word “article.” However, workers are only rendered eligible for TAA if
the shift of production overseas of articles has an economic effect on
the domestic workers.432 If the shift overseas is not a shift of articles,
but rather a shift of services, then the displaced workers are not
eligible for assistance.433 Reflective of the issue facing the ITC, the
claims based on articles have changed significantly overs the years,
transitioning from traditional tangible items with a set commercial
value to intangible items with an uncertain commercial value. The
judicial interpretation of the term article in the TAA context is
instructive, if not determinative, in the ITC context. Assistance is now
offered under the TAA to workers if their jobs have been affected by
the shift overseas of intangible articles, as well as tangible.434
Intangible articles render workers eligible for assistance if such
articles would render workers eligible if embodied in a physical
medium. Furthermore, the commercial value of articles is no longer a
consideration in determining what an “article” is for purposes of
deciding whether assistance is available.435
Until 2006, the Department of Labor routinely denied assistance
to workers whose jobs were affected by the shift overseas of intangible
articles. In January of 2006, the Court of International Trade (CIT)
held that the “Trade Act does not define the term ‘articles’ within the
statutory language, and specifically absent is a tangibility
requirement.” 436 The CIT went on to find that a requirement “that
software code must be on a physical medium to be an article”

431. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (2018) (e.g., “imports of articles like or directly competitive
with articles”).
432. 19 U.S.C. § 2481, 2272 (2018) (“imports of articles or services like or directly
competitive with articles produced or services supplied by such firm have increased”);
Fortin v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 525, 525–26 (1st Cir. 1979).
433. See, e.g., Fortin, 608 F.2d at 528 (“[T]he term ‘article’ as used throughout the
Trade Act, was not meant to include services . . . .”).
434. Lands’ End, A Subsidiary of Sears Roebuck and Company, Business
Outfitters CAD Operations, Dodgeville, Wisconsin: Notice of Determination on
Remand, 71 Fed. Reg. 18357, 18357 (Apr. 11, 2006).
435. Former Emps. of Merrill Corp. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 874, 881
(2005).
436. Former Emps. of Comput. Scis. Corp. v. Sec’y. of Labor, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1334,
1340 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006).
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incongruous with recent technology.437 According to the CIT, “the
plain language of the Trade Act does not require that an article must
be tangible.”438
Labor subsequently issued three administrative decisions that
changed the Agency’s definition of the term “article.” In a series of
decisions reversing earlier denials of assistance,439 Labor found that
“there are tangible and intangible articles” and clarified that
“[s]oftware and similar intangible goods that would have been
considered articles for the purposes of the Trade Act if embodied in a
physical medium will now be considered to be articles regardless of
their method of transfer.” 440
The articles included financial software, coded in India, sent back
into the United States and packaged and sold here;441 software
produced in Mexico; and computerized embroidery and logo
designs.442 Each of these represented intangible articles, and until
the CIT remanded the rejections to Labor, denial of assistance was
automatic.443 Labor, upon remand from the CIT, found that an
intangible article “that would have been considered an article if
embodied in a physical medium” was an article for purposes of the
TAA.444 Labor also found that when Mexican workers were “being
trained in the production of new software” and “the production of such
software now occurs in Mexico,” the Mexican workers were “engaged
in the production of an article” and therefore the displaced American
workers were entitled to assistance for the shift of software
production, intangible articles, overseas.445 Finally, Labor looked at

437. Id. at 1342.
438. Id. at 1343.
439. The earlier “negative determination was based on the findings that the
subject worker group provided business and information consulting, specialized
application software, and technology outsourcing support to customers in the financial
services industry, and that the workers did not produce an article within the meaning
of Section 222 of the Trade Act of 1974.” Computer Sciences Corporation, Financial
Services Group, East Hartford Connecticut: Notice of Revised Determination on
Remand, 71 Fed. Reg. 18355, 18355 (Apr. 11, 2006).
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Electronic Data Systems Corporation I Solutions Center, Fairborn, Ohio:
Notice of Revised Determination on Remand, 71 Fed. Reg. 18355, 18356 (Apr. 11,
2006).
443. Computer Sciences Corporation, 71 Fed Reg. 18355 at 18355; Electronic Data
Systems Corporation I Solutions Center, 71 Fed. Reg. 18355 at 18356.
444. Computer Sciences Corporation, 71 Fed. Reg. 18355 at 18355.
445. Electronic Data Systems Corporation I Solutions Center, 71 Fed. Reg. 18355
at 18356.
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workers “engaged in computerizing embroidery and logo designs” and
found they were producing articles, as well, despite the lack of a
physical medium.446 Labor found that “the workers’ firm produced an
intangible article (digitized embroidery designs) that would have been
considered an article if embodied in a physical medium” and that since
articles can be both intangible and tangible, the workers were eligible
to receive assistance.447 After this decision, assistance under the TAA
was extended to workers whose jobs were affected by the shift
overseas of intangible articles, as long as such articles would have
been considered articles if embodied in a physical medium.448
These Administrative law cases set forth the change in
understanding by Labor to the definition of “article” in the Trade Act
of 1974. In 2006, the CIT recognized a change in the Agency’s policy
and summarized the holdings of the three decisions discussed above,
while not going so far as to adopt the holdings as CIT rulings,
inherently sanctioned a definition of article that includes tangible and
intangible items.449
Reiterating Labor’s policy shift and the applicable interpretation
of the term “article” by Labor, the CIT found that article included both
tangible and intangible goods “regardless of their method of transfer.”
450 The former employees of Merrill Corporation sought assistance
under the TAA after their jobs producing financial documents were
eliminated.451 The employees were initially denied assistance because
they were “engaged in the production of an intangible—rather than
tangible—article” and subsequently denied assistance because the
items produced by Merrill lacked commercial value.452 Chastising
Labor, the CIT held that a “distinction between tangible and
intangible articles appears nowhere in the Trade Act…[and t]he
distinction between tangible and intangible articles is contrary to the
purpose of the Trade Act.” 453 The CIT held that any distinction

446. Lands’ End, A Subsidiary of Sears Roebuck and Company, Business
Outfitters CAD Operations, Dodgeville, Wisconsin: Notice of Determination on
Remand, 71 Fed. Reg. 18357, 18357 (Apr. 11, 2006).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Former Emps. of IBM Corp., Glob. Servs. Div. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 462 F.
Supp. 2d 1239, 1241 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006).
450. Id.
451. Former Emps. of Merrill Corp. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 874, 876
(2005).
452. Former Emps. of Merrill Corp. v. United States (Merrill II), 483 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1267 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007).
453. Id.
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between “tangible and intangible articles is ‘arbitrary’ and ‘manifestly
contrary to the statute.’”454 The purpose of the Trade Act is “to provide
adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor
against unfair or injurious import competition, and to assist
industries, firm [sic], workers, and communities to adjust to changes
in international trade flows.”455
The Trade Act does not define article, nor does it limit the
definition to tangible items only. Labor’s regulations support the
conclusion that software code, regardless of the mode of importation,
including code imported via the Internet, is an article under the Trade
Act. Electronic transmissions of all kinds are articles, tangible or
intangible.
3. United States International Trade Commission
In enacting the Trade Act of 1974, Congress neglected to define
the word “article” leaving interpretation of the term up to the agencies
implementing the Trade Act of 1974. The ITC has exercised domain
over numerous articles, without providing a comprehensive definition
of the term, which may have been chosen because it “is itself a
nebulous concept seemingly employed . . . for the very reason that it
possesses an indefinite and neutral meaning.”456
The frequent use of the undefined word article throughout the
Trade Act “suggests . . . an intention that it assume the meaning and
coloration appropriate to its specific context and best suited to
effectuate the Congressional plan.”457 The Commission was first
tasked with formally adjudicating its jurisdiction over software in the
383 Investigation.458 At that time, the ITC treated software as an
article of importation regardless of its mode of importation but
decided not to exclude the software.459 Instead, the Commission issued
a cease and desist order that prohibited “the importation (including
via electronic transmission), sale, offer for sale, lease, loan, other
transfer, duplication, or distribution (including electronic

454. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)).
455. 19 U.S.C. § 2012(4) (2000).
456. Close & Stewart v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 466, 468 (Cust. Ct. 1967).
457. Id. at 469.
458. 383 Investigation, supra note 416, at 28.
459. Former Emps. of Comput. Scis. Corp. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 414 F. Supp. 2d
1334, 1342 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006) (citing Commission Opinion on Remedy, the Public
Interest, and Bonding, USITC Pub. 1998-3089, at 28–29 (Mar. 30, 1998), in 383
Investigation, supra note 416, at 29).
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distribution) of imported software and other components that
contributorily infringe the patents in issue.” 460
Focusing on the fact that § 337 exists to protect domestic
companies from the importation of articles that infringe domestic
intellectual property rights, the Commission found that electronically
or physically, both infringe on these rights. “Congress has delegated
broad authority to the ITC to determine what constitutes an ‘article’
for purposes of Title 19 of the United States Code.”461 CBP may have
difficulty regulating electronic transmissions into the United
States,462 but the question of what CBP can do is a different question
from what the ITC can do to protect domestic industry. Electronic
transmission of respondents’ software is not substantively different
from storing the software on a medium and shipping the medium into
the United States. The ease of circumventing an exclusion order by
electronic transmissions, or the difficulty of CBP’s enforcement of that
exclusion order of that software do not affect the scope of the
Commission’s jurisdiction or cause the Commission to limit the reach
of its remedial orders. It makes little sense to find harm to domestic
industry by the importation of a CD-ROM or disk containing
respondents’ software, a component of an emulation system, but not
by the use of that very same component imported in machine-readable
form by electronic transmission.
The legislative history of § 337 reflects debate by members of both
houses and witnesses at hearings using the term “articles”
synonymously with “goods,” “merchandise,” and “commodities.”463 As
noted above, CBP has found that intangible articles are goods and
merchandise.464 Furthermore, § 337 has been amended a dozen times,
and no amendment has suggested any congressional intent to limit
460. 383 Investigation, supra note 416, at 21.
461. Former Emps. of Comput. Scis. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (citing 19
U.S.C. §§ 1332, 3005 (2012)).
462. It may be difficult, but it is not impossible. In China, for instance, the
government has implemented what is known colloquially as the Great Firewall of
China. The Great Firewall of China restricts access to electronic transmissions inside
China. Charles Riley, The Great Firewall of China Is Nearly Complete, CNN (Dec. 30,
2014, 1:10 PM) http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/30/technology/china-internet-firewallgoogle/ (“Beijing often describes what is known colloquially as the ‘Great Firewall’ as
a critical national security tool. ‘I can choose who will be a guest in my home,’ China's
top Internet regulator Lu Wei said earlier this year.”).
463. See, e.g., Hearings, Second Session on Intellectual Property and Trade Before
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1986), https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_
resources/lipa/patents/Intellectual%20Property%20and%20Trade,%20Subcomm.%20
%28Feb.%2019,%20Apr.%2023,%20May%2021,%201986%29%20Part%20A.pdf.
464. See Customs Ruling HQ 114459, supra note 422.
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the definition “articles” to include only tangible articles. Limiting
articles of commerce to tangible items arbitrarily excludes a broad
range of infringing products and restricts the ability of the ITC to
perform its intended function.
The language of § 1337 refers to “sale for importation,”
“importation,” and “sale after importation,” all of which can cover
electronic data transmissions of commercial value.465 Statutory
construction supports the concept that articles are “imported items
that are bought and sold in commerce,” whether those articles are
tangible or intangible.466 Despite this, the Federal Circuit has held
that the jurisdiction of the ITC does not extend to the transmissions
of digital data.467 So holding, locks “the International Trade
Commission into technological antiquity.”468 The mission of the ITC is
to “investigate and make determinations in proceedings involving
imports claimed to injure a domestic industry or violate U.S.
intellectual property rights,”469 and there is no dispute that the
intangible is covered by the patent statute and can, itself, be
infringed. Furthermore, such infringement can injure a domestic
industry. In order to exclude the intangible and protect domestic
industry, any reasonable definition of article under § 337 must include
both the tangible and intangible.
B. Remedies
The ITC is not an agency established to protect intellectual
property rights holders, but rather to protect the domestic industry
using intellectual property rights and both its scope of interest and
the scope of available remedies is limited by such.470 Central to the
mission of the ITC is its ability to protect domestic industry and
promote trade by regulating “imports claimed to injure a domestic

465. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018).
466. 833 Investigation, supra note 9, at 40.
467. ClearCorrect Operating v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“Here we conclude that the literal text by itself, when viewed in context and
with an eye towards the statutory scheme, is clear and thus answers the question at
hand. ‘Articles’ is defined as ‘material things,’ and thus does not extend to electronic
transmission of digital data.”).
468. Id. at 1310 (Newman, J., dissenting).
469. About the USITC, supra note 397.
470. The jurisdiction of the ITC arises in rem, which allows remedies when in
personam jurisdiction may not exist. See generally Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Kumar, supra note 410, at 1912.
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industry or violate U.S. intellectual property rights.”471 If unlawful
activities are found, then the ITC may issue a general exclusion order
(GEO) directed to all articles that violate the U.S. intellectual
property rights and injure a domestic industry; the ITC can issue a
limited exclusion order (LEO) directed to only the specific articles that
are named in the complaint and violate the U.S. intellectual property
rights; and/or the ITC can issue a cease and desist order directed to
the persons engaging in the violations of the U.S. intellectual property
rights.472 Each of these allows the ITC to protect domestic industry in
a different and compelling fashion.473 The Trade Act of 1974
specifically gave the ITC the power to issue cease and desist orders
because:
[T]he existing statute, which provides no remedy other
than exclusion of articles from entry, is so extreme or
inappropriate in some cases that it is often likely to
result in the Commission not finding a violation of this
section, thus reducing the effectiveness of section 337
for the purposes intended.474
Cease and desist orders expanded the ITC’s power, giving the
Commission the ability to regulate infringing methods for the first
time, an essential part of the imposition of import restrictions.475
The ITC addressed the question of tangible versus intangible
articles head-on in the 510 investigation.476 In the 510 investigation,
Trend Micro complained that Fortinet, Inc. (Fortinet) was committing
unfair acts and harming domestic industry by its “importation into
the United States, the sale for importation into the United States, or
the sale within the United States after importation of certain systems
for detecting and removing computer viruses or worms, components

471. About the USITC, supra note 397.
472. About Section 337, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.usitc.gov/
intellectual_property/about_section_337.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2020).
473. Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, USITC Pub.
863 (Feb. 22, 1978) (Final) (“Prior to 1974 the sole power of the Commission in section
337 cases was to recommend to the President an exclusion order.”).
474. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON FIN. TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON H.R.
10710, TRADE ACT OF 1974, S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 198 (1974).
475. See id.
476. In the Matter of Certain Systems for Detecting and Removing Viruses or
Worms, Components Thereof, and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-510,
USITC Pub. 3936 (Aug. 2007) [hereinafter 510 Investigation].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456255

558

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87.483

thereof, and products containing same.” 477 The ITC determined that
Fortinet was in violation of section 337 and fashioned a two-part
remedy for this violation.478 First, the ITC issued an exclusion order
barring the “importation of infringing antiviral software in a tangible
medium.” 479 Second, acknowledging CBP’s determination not to
regulate electronic technology—and Fortinet’s technology which
transmits updates to the software electronically—the ITC issued a
cease and desist order barring “the electronic transmission of the
infringing antivirus software module by Fortinet.”480 Absent the twopart remedy, the detrimental impact on domestic industry would
continue hampering the ITC’s ability to protect trade, as Fortinet
would remain free to transmit electronically and unfairly the
infringing software.
Congress does not need to give the ITC additional statutory
authority to regulate intangible articles. In choosing the broad word
“articles” and not using “articles of manufacture” or other limiting
language, Congress gave a broad swath of rights to the ITC, and that
original statutory authority should be respected.
V. CLAIMING THE INTANGIBLE
Careful claim drafting can help innovators avoid many of the
issues faced by those seeking to protect Information Age technology.
Drafting claims tying the intangible to the tangible helps Information
Age technology fit under the protection of Industrial Age laws. An
example of claim drafting that addresses many of these problems can
be found in the 2019 patent issued to Bose for a streaming audio
player using a cloud-based service to transmit and respond to spoken
user queries.481 The claim was carefully drafted to keep all elements
of the patented method within the United States.482 The method
claimed receiving data from the cloud—but does not require any steps
that occur only in the cloud.483 As a result, all steps can occur within

477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Claim 21 reads: “The streaming audio player of claim 20, wherein the first
digital audio data comprises a response to the spoken user query that is received from
a cloud-based service.” U.S. Patent No. 10,200,004 (filed July 6, 2018) (issued Feb. 5,
2019).
482. See id.
483. See id.
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the United States, avoiding many of the issues addressed by this
Article.
In 1975, James Diehr and Thomas Lutton sought to patent a
process for curing rubber.484 Humans could use a mold press to cure
rubber, but the use of a digital computer rendered the cure more
efficient and more accurate.485 The Supreme Court found that this
method claimed patent-eligible subject matter as it claimed “a process
for molding rubber products.”486 The process was software, but since
the result was a tangible one, the Supreme Court found the process
patentable.487
Almost fifty years later, Blue Spike patented a method of
monitoring and analyzing signals.488 These patents claim the use of
software to compare works of art, such as songs, video, or images and
differentiate between the various works.489 Humans can compare
works of art, but the software renders such a comparison faster and
more accurately.490 In the course of one of many of Blue Spike’s patent
infringement suits, the Northern District of California found that the
patents were drawn to abstract ideas, and, furthermore, that the
innovation consisted of merely using “routine computer components
and methods . . . to accomplish this task with, in certain
circumstances, greater efficiency than a human mind could
achieve.”491 The court did go on to say that if the patent disclaimed
what a human could do, and only claimed the benefits of the computer-

484. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (No. 79-1112).
485. Id. at 2–3. (“Rubber products produced in a mold press are cured in the press
for a specified time. . . . The time needed to obtain a good cure depends in part on the
temperature inside the press, which is regulated by a thermostat. . . . It is possible,
using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships, to calculate when to open
the press and remove the cured product. . . . The disadvantages of this practice are
that erring on the side of caution will usually lead to overcuring the rubber, while
keeping the mold open for more than a ‘reasonable’ time will often result in
undercuring. . . . [The] claimed invention employs a digital computer to overcome these
drawbacks.”).
486. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 191.
487. Id. at 192–93.
488. Blue Spike holds a number of such patents. See U.S. Patent No. 8,712,728
(issued Apr. 29, 2014); U.S. Patent No. 8,214,175 (issued July 3, 2012); U.S. Patent
No. 7,949,494 (issued May 24, 2011); U.S. Patent No. 7,660,700 (issued Feb. 9, 2010);
U.S. Patent No. 7,346,472 (issued Mar. 18, 2008).
489. Brief of Appellee Google Inc. at 6, Blue Spike, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 20161054 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 14, 2016).
490. Id. at 33.
491. Blue Spike, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 14-CV-01650-YGR, 2015 WL
5260506, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2015).
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implemented comparison, then perhaps the claim would be patent
eligible492—but that would lead to an exceptionally narrow claim
indeed.
There has been a tremendous sea change in the fifty years
between Diehr’s invention and Blue Spike’s invention. As Justice
Stevens noted in his dissent to Diehr, patenting software would have
been nigh near impossible before 1968.493 A method of curing rubber,
on the other hand, was patentable, as the Supreme Court noted in
1881 when it stated that there was no doubt that a process could be
patentable, giving as one example Goodyear’s patent for a process of
vulcanizing rubber.494 The patenting of software to perform a process
that was, itself, clearly patentable, represented a shift in the judicial
views of patentable subject matter—but a shift made palatable by the
tangible and timeless subject matter of the software. Even though the
machines in Diehr were routine, and the art of curing rubber was wellknown, the incorporation of software and the advantages and
efficiencies brought by the software resulted in patent-eligible subject
matter. Blue Spike, on the other hand, was seeking to patent a method
of using intangible software to accomplish an intangible result—that
of comparing signals. Although both Blue Spike and Diehr patented
software that performed human tasks, only Blue Spike’s technology is
abstract, as Diehr’s process uses software to generate a tangible
product.495 The tangible nature of the outcome of the process is the
dividing line between the patentability of Diehr’s software and the
patentability of Blue Spike’s software.496
However, not all innovations can be so claimed,497 and for those
innovations, care needs to be taken that the rights of those who seek
to patent the intangible are not abrogated by a rigid categorical
approach to patent protection. Patent attorneys routinely include

492. Id.
493. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
494. In 1844, Charles Goodyear was issued a patent for a method of vulcanizing
rubber. U.S. Patent No. 3633 (issued June 15, 1844).
495. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
496. Id. at 192–93.
497. Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 271
(2005) (“Computer networking and software inventions routinely present such
challenges, and client- or service-centered claiming strategies have long been
employed by those who focus on such technologies. It is important to note, however,
that as communications technologies support ever increasing bandwidth, virtually any
innovation that employs computation or decision-making is susceptible to placement
of a particular component or step with an independent vendor or outside the United
States in a way that may avoid traditional infringement remedies.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456255

2020]

INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY

561

system and method claims in the same application.498 It cannot make
sense to place a higher value on system claims to devices that can be
used domestically and internationally than on method claims. Nor
should claim drafting be entirely ignored by the courts. Finding a
device used domestically is not a way to fix a claim drafting error.
Instead, such a determination recognizes the fact that the end-user
benefits domestically from a method that crosses geographic
boundaries, and therefore, an unauthorized use harms the patent
system—even if every step does not occur domestically.
The spirit and intention of patent protection extend as thoroughly
to method claims as they do to system claims. Unauthorized use
occurs within the United States, regardless of the type of invention, if
the use is controlled within the geographic boundaries and domestic
benefit accrues from that use. Domestic industry is harmed by those
who unfairly import electronic transmissions, just as must as it is
harmed by those who unfairly import media on which data is
recorded. Limiting the scope of the ITC to tangible data will result in
claims being drafted to reflect this unfair restriction on the mission of
the ITC. That should not have to be the case.
PurePredictive, Inc. is a small company that specializes in
machine learning innovations and automating advanced analytics
through the use of artificial intelligence (AI).499 Open-source software
company H2O runs a machine learning platform.500 PurePredictive
sued H2O for patent infringement.501 Applying Alice, the court found
that the software was an abstract idea, as PurePredictive was unable
to show that “its claims improve the functioning of a computer-related
technology rather than use computers as a tool.”502 Using machine
learning to improve analytics remains an intangible, abstract idea,
leaving PurePredictive to satisfy the second factor of the Alice test.
PurePredictive’s innovation uses software to render more efficient
and accurate well-known analytic models and is “simply an
implementation of the basic concept of predictive analytics.”503

498. See, e.g., Jefferson Perkins, “System” Travels Abroad, “Method” Gets
Grounded: Transnational Reach and Acts of Infringement of Different U.S. Patent
Claim Types After NTP v. RIM (Fed. Cir.), DUPAGE COUNTY BAR ASS’N (Dec. 2005),
https://www.dcba.org/mpage/vol181205art5.
499. PUREPREDICTIVE, http://www.purepredictive.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 5,
2020).
500. PurePredictive, Inc. v. H20.AI, Inc., No. 17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 WL
3721480, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
501. Id. at *1.
502. Id. at *5 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 222, 224 (2014)).
503. Id. at *7.
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AI systems seem sure to become further embedded in many
industries as well as into daily life around the world. How to best
protect these inventions is a complicated issue and an increasingly
important area. As argued by Professor Asay in Artificial Stupidity,
AI is one field where there may not be a current solution to promote
innovation while also promoting disclosure.504 AI is commonly used to
accomplish well-known tasks in new computer-aided manners, as the
PurePredictive example shows.505 When the innovation is the use of
an intangible assist, enforcing a patent on a new method of
accomplishing a non-novel concept has proven a complicated task
under the modern interpretation of the patent laws. The number of
issued patents in the field of Machine Learning shot up 34% between
2013 and 2017, rendering AI one of the fastest growing areas of patent
grants.506 Enforcing that patent in federal courts by meeting the twopart Alice test, however, remains nothing more than an abstract idea
for many artificial intelligence developers.507Alice states that an
innovation claiming an abstract idea, like artificial intelligence, may
be patent-eligible if that innovation claims an “inventive concept” that
transforms the abstract idea into one that is patent eligible.508 As
PurePredictive learned, when the inventive concept is using AI to
accomplish a human task with greater efficiency and speed, proving
that the inventive concept is not well known in the art is immensely
difficult.509
In drafting a patent, a good prosecutor will always take into
consideration not only who owns the patent, but who will be using the
patent, and who the patentee may wish to prevent from using the
patent. AI, as a field, has at least as one goal: to render a device

504. Clark Asay, Artificial Stupidity, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1187, 1195 (2020).
505. PUREPREDICTIVE, supra note 499.
506. Louis Columbus, Roundup of Machine Learning, Forecasts and Market
Estimates, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/
2018/02/18/roundup-of-machine-learning-forecasts-and-market-estimates-2018/#290
6357f2225.
507. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 504, at 1203 (citing Jonathan Stroud & Derek M.
Kim, Debugging Software Patents After Alice, 69 S.C. L. REV. 177, 178, 191, 205, 218
(2017)); Susan Y. Tull & Paula E. Miller, Patenting Artificial Intelligence: Issues of
Obviousness, Inventorship, and Patent Eligibility, 1 J. ROBOTICS ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 313, 315–16 (2018) (discussing subject matter problems in the
context of medicinal products).
508. Alice, 573 U.S. at 222, 225–26.
509. See PurePredictive, Inc. v. H20.AI, Inc., No. 17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 WL
3721480, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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autonomous.510 Machine autonomy can make detection of
infringement very difficult, and render nigh near impossible a
determination of who the infringer is.511 Patents must be drafted
taking into consideration both the possibility of infringement being
difficult to detect and who will be considered the infringer.
Furthermore, a patent prosecutor may seek to narrow the patent and,
thus, limit the protection for the artificial intelligence innovation by
tying the invention to the tangible and avoiding falling down Alice’s
rabbit hole.512 A narrower patent is generally a less valuable
patent.513 This limited protection, combined with the increasing cost
of patent litigation, and concerns over the enforceability of these
patents in the judicial system, may disincentivize artificial
intelligence innovators from even applying for patents on their
innovations in the first place.
Careful claim drafting can ameliorate many of the issues
articulated in this article. Finding an invention used domestically
cannot rescue a patent prosecutor who has made an error in claim
drafting. The invention remains that claimed by the patentee and
nothing more. The intention is to determine what that invention is,
where the invention is controlled from, and who benefits from the
invention.
VI. TRADE SECRETS AND PRIVATE ORDERING
Innovation in the Information Age evolves rapidly—and, as this
Article points out, is often poorly protected by the Industrial Age laws.
Given the tremendous difficulties in protecting the intangible in the
patent system, it can be foreseen that many innovators will turn to
trade secrets and private ordering for protection instead. Trade secrets
and private ordering creates tremendous barriers to entry in these
fields and is not in the public’s best interest. At the moment, for
instance, autonomous vehicles are a rapidly developing field of
innovation. Many developers in this field are relying on trade secret
laws and private ordering to protect their valuable technology.514

510. See, e.g., Rodney Brooks, Intelligence Without Representation, 47 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 139, 145–47 (1991).
511. See generally Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, Artificial Intelligence Inventions & Patent
Disclosure, 125 PENN. STATE L. REV. 1 (2020).
512. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
513. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 440 (2004).
514. Lucas Dahlin et al., Autonomous Cars Are Driving the Reinvention of IP
Protection, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 7, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/07/
autonomous-cars-driving-reinvention-of-ip-protection/.
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Private ordering can be a significant stumbling block for competitors
seeking to enter new markets and defeats the value of our patent
system. Without the public disclosure required by the patent laws,
competitors do not have the information to design around other
autonomous cars, and are, perhaps, more reluctant to enter a field
where the start-up costs are high.515 Fewer competitors means fewer
choices for consumers, and fewer choices may mean higher costs.516
There are other potential issues as well—including “the temptation of
competitors to shortcut the multi-million-mile learning process by
hiring away valued employees and encouraging theft of the learned
data.” 517 Furthermore, trade secret protection requires a tremendous
amount of security and a small pipeline of talent, which can also
increase the costs.
Trade secret protection and private ordering carry significant
limitations. Cummins, one of the largest American manufacturers of
diesel engines, is an innovator in many fields, including natural gasfueled engines.518 Cummins sells engines all over the world and has
joint ventures to sell, manufacture, and maintain engines in numerous
countries, including Russia,519 China,520 and the Middle East.521 Trade
secret protection and contracts are not adequate for Cummins.
Cummins needs to have its partners be able to manufacture and
maintain its engines and to do so must share internal information
about those engines. A contract only provides so much protection.
Breach of a non-disclosure agreement can result in charges against the
breacher—but once the information is disseminated, the non-disclosure
agreement has lost its effectiveness. Protection against trade secret
theft is a real issue—particularly if combined with international
facilities. Between 2008 and 2012, at least “58 defendants [were]

515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. See Cummins Engines, CUMMINS, https://www.cummins.com/cumminsengines (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
519. Cummins Inc., Cummins and Russian Manufacturer KAMAZ Form Joint
Venture to Produce Mid-Range Engines, BUSINESSINSIDER (Jan. 24, 2006),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/cummins-and-russianmanufacturer-kamaz-form-joint-venture-to-produce-mid-range-engines-444950.
520. Cummins and JAC Form Joint Venture Partnership, CUMMINS INC. (May 11,
2018), https://www.cummins.com/news/releases/2018/05/11/cummins-and-jac-motorsform-joint-venture-partnership.
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(Mar. 29, 2016), https://dieselprogress.com/news/industry-news/cummins-new-middleeast-joint-venture/1842/.
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charged in Federal Court related to Chinese espionage,” including
espionage charges for selling “biotech trade secrets from Dow
Chemical and Cargill Inc. to China” 522 and theft of source code for
American Semiconductor’s wind turbine.523 American Semiconductor
was so concerned about theft of its intellectual property that it “went
to great lengths to lock down its software and allow access only by its
own employees.” 524 American Semiconductor learned of the theft after
its partner began using an unreleased version of the operation
software.525 The strength of the patent system is the protection it
provides to those who disclose the relevant information to the public.
For many of these international companies, and even domestic
companies, participating in numerous joint ventures, that protection
is worth the disclosure. The problem, as this Article points out, may
be getting that protection in the first place.
There is a strong public policy in promoting the protection of
science and the useful arts through the patent system. The patent
system grants patentees the right to exclusive use of their innovation
for a limited time in return for describing their innovations and
enabling others to practice the art. However, as the limitations on the
rewards given to Information Age innovations shrink, the incentives
for disclosure diminish as well. Innovations are increasingly being
protected by trade secrets and private ordering—narrowing the
dedication to the public of the description of the invention.
Using trade secret as a form of protection and relying on private
ordering presents a different set of problems for the owners of the
intellectual property. However, such use also expands the protection
of intellectual property far beyond the scope envisioned by the patent
system. The balance between promotion of science and the useful arts,
the reward granted innovators, and our Industrial Age laws is
currently undermining the public policy central to our patent system.
In the Information Age, innovators deserve protection based on the
patent-eligibility of the invention, not the tangible nature of the
invention.

522. Michael P. Collins, Ah, Let Me Count the Ways China is Stealing Our Secrets,
Part 1, MANUFACTURING.NET (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.manufacturing.
net/blog/2012/02/ah-let-me-count-ways-china-stealing-our-secrets-part-1.
523. Garrett M. Graff, China’s 5 Steps for Recruiting Spies, WIRED (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/china-spy-recruitment-us/.
524. Id.
525. Id.
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CONCLUSION
There is a problem, and it needs to be fixed. In 2025, it is estimated
that there will be over 75 billion devices connected to the Internet of
Things.526 Each of these devices will be trafficking in the intangible—
through their transmissions of data as well as the methods of using
the devices. Without the clarifications detailed in this Article,
domestic innovators will find themselves in the Wild West—looking
to private ordering to protect their innovation, innovating overseas,
or seeking ways to ensure that if their innovations cannot be
protected, then their innovations cannot be copied. There is a
substantial public interest in building the public storehouse of
knowledge. It is time to recognize that the United States Patent Code
and the Trade Act of 1974 do not discriminate between protection of
the intangible and the tangible.
If the internet is to be free of borders as many have argued, then
the public interests in promoting innovation and protecting domestic
industry must be re-evaluated.527 With the erosion of geographic
boundaries, the increase in intangible innovation, and the seamless
integration of technology that exists outside the misunderstood
boundaries of domestic patent and trade policies, technology will soon
bloom with no guidelines and no public regulation, promoting the
interests of those developing the technology, not those consuming it.
A company seeking to protect the intangible and promote the public
interest in disclosure faces many obstacles. At the PTO, the company
seeking to patent the intangible must prove that their innovation is
not abstract.528 A suit for patent infringement on a method is held to
a different standard than a suit for patent infringement on a system.
At the ITC, the e-reader holding the data can be excluded, but not the
data the e-reader downloads.529 The internet should be free of
borders—but geographic boundaries should not undercut the value of
the intangible to patentees.
Statutory language requires no differentiation between method
claims, machine claims, and system claims. If the subject matter is

526.

SAM LUCERO, IHS TECHNOLOGY, IOT PLATFORMS: ENABLING THE INTERNET
5 (2016).
527. Editorial Board, Keep the Internet Free of Borders, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/opinion/keep-the-internet-free-of-borders.
html.
528. Interim Guidelines, supra note 23.
529. See Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 553, 556–57 (D.
Del. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 626 F. App’x.
1010 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
OF THINGS

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456255

2020]

INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY

567

patent eligible, then it should be subject to the same protection
regardless of the type of claim or the category of the patent.
Clarification can best occur by amending § 100 to define invention and
utility clearly.530 Our patent boundaries need to be reset and
evaluated in light of where the invention will be perceived as being
practiced by the users; does the unauthorized user know of the patent
at the time of the unauthorized use; what are the terms of the
arrangement leading to the question of whether the invention is being
practiced within the United States; what are the nature of the
intellectual property and the character of the commercial
embodiment; how is the pricing of the agreement structured, what
aspects are occurring where, and to whom does the financial benefit
of the invention accrue; what is the commercial relationship between
the site where potential infringement could occur and the site where
control of the invention is retained; what is the established
profitability of the invention; how commercially successful is it and
what is its current popularity; and what are the economic realities of
the potential infringement. The ease with which intangible
information crosses geographic boundaries and the very nature of the
domestic industry in intangible technology demonstrates how vital
the ITC’s role is in information-age technology. The ITC is unable to
fulfill its mission of protecting domestic industry without having the
ability to exclude all articles, tangible or intangible, that are harming
domestic industry and are the subject of unfair acts.
At a recent Senate hearing, it was said that “If it ain’t tangible, it
ain’t patent eligible.”531 This needs to be fixed. Much of modern
innovation focuses on data—an intangible asset fraught with value
and judgment. The Industrial Age laws can protect both public
interest and promote innovation in the Information Age.

530. See supra Section II.
531. The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part 1: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of Robert A. Armitage, Consultant on IP Strategy & Policy).
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